This post is about Israel’s Frenemies constantly complaining about Jerusalem, The “Two State Solution” and Whatever.Compare the size of New York City to Jerusalem Compare the size of New York City to Jerusalem |
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Israel’s Frenemies constantly complaining
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Israel is at war
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Jerusalem and EI area boundaries Jerusalem and EI area boundaries |
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Israel’s Frenemies tried a Jerusalem building Freeze Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs https://jcfa.org The End of Building Freezes in the Jerusalem AreaConstruction plans approved in E-1 and Givat Hamatos areasNadav Shragai  Givat Hamatos (The Israel Project, CC-BY-SA-2.0) There are two strategic building plans for Jerusalem. Givat Hamatos, which is only 300 meters from the Green Line, will prevent the possibility of a wedge dividing Jerusalem from the south.
E-1, between Maaleh Adumim and Jerusalem and as part of Greater Jerusalem, will strengthen the Israeli-planned east-west contiguity to the Dead Sea and perhaps stymie north-south Palestinian territorial contiguity.
Good News for JerusalemJust days before Israel’s latest elections, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decided to end the construction freeze on two neighborhoods of strategic importance to Jerusalem, where construction was frozen for many years. The first is in Givat Hamatos, where tenders for the construction of 1,077 housing units were issued on February 24, 2020, by the Israel Land Authority. Construction in Givat Hamatos has been frozen for seven years. The second neighborhood is the “E-1” neighborhood, between Maaleh Adumim and Jerusalem, where Prime Minister Netanyahu announced that a plan to build 3,500 housing units would be issued for public review. E-1 construction has been frozen for 15 years. These are two brand new neighborhoods. In Givat Hamatos, a trailer site had been built for new immigrants from Ethiopia. Infrastructure has already been established in E-1: roads, sewage system, water, electricity, and a police station.
 Note Givat Hamatos’ undeveloped location between the Israeli neighborhoods of Gilo, Har Homa, and Ramat Rachel. (Google Earth) Note Givat Hamatos’ undeveloped location between the Israeli neighborhoods of Gilo, Har Homa, and Ramat Rachel. (Google Earth) Construction Freeze during the Obama EraThe plan for the construction in southern Jerusalem of the Jewish residential neighborhood in Givat Hamatos was approved by the District Planning and Building Committee of the Jerusalem Area as already in 2014 but has since been frozen. Pressured by the United States, Germany, and other countries in the EU, the publication of tenders for construction has been delayed time and time again. This is a strategically significant construction program, which lies along the Green Line (but outside it), 300 meters from the Talpiot industrial area and adjacent to Hebron Road, a major traffic artery in what the world calls: “West Jerusalem.”
From the Israeli point of view, the construction of Givat Hamatos is one of the keys to preventing the division of Jerusalem from the south, which will prevent a Palestinian wedge that will block the long-planned Israeli contiguity between the Gilo and Har Homa neighborhoods on the southern border of Jerusalem. [See map 1.] In October 2017, a drilling operation for sampling the land began on the site, with the intention of starting and implementing the construction plans, but under pressure from the United States (during the Obama administration) and Germany, the move was frozen again.
From the Palestinian perspective, the construction freeze on Givat Hamatos is the key to preserving the option of an urban connection, and in the future, a political one, between Bethlehem and Beit Safafa, an Arab neighborhood in south Jerusalem. According to the Palestinians, such contiguity will form part of the Palestinian urban fabric, which in the future will form the territories of East Jerusalem, “the future Palestinian state capital.”
At the Annapolis Conference (2007), the Palestinians proposed an exchange of land with Israel, which included the continued existence of all major Jewish neighborhoods in east Jerusalem, including the Jewish Quarter, except for Har Homa and Givat Hamatos, which they demanded Israel evacuate.
Givat Hamatos is one of the last land reserves (apart from Atarot) available for construction for Jews under Jerusalem jurisdiction. Some 2,610 housing units are planned for the Jewish population.
Nearby, at Beit Safafa, increased density of built-up areas on private land was approved for the Arab neighborhood, (600-900 housing units), mainly by increasing the percentage of construction on the site instead of crowding in more buildings. This area, too – according to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s announcement – is now permitted for construction.
The plan for the construction of the Jewish neighborhood of Givat Hamatos is a direct continuation of the establishment of 12 large Jewish neighborhoods built since 1967 in the territories attached to united Jerusalem. The establishment of these neighborhoods is aimed at preventing the city’s division again while simultaneously preserving the Jewish majority in Jerusalem. The establishment of Jewish neighborhoods in the many empty areas annexed to Jerusalem, neighborhoods where today there are approximately 215,000 Jews, is intended to secure, both by territory and demography, the Jewish majority in Jerusalem and prevent the possibility of re-division.
E1: Part of “Greater Jerusalem”The “E-1” construction building plan is also very important for Jerusalem.  The “E-1” construction building plan Area Map
It covers an area of about 12,000 dunams, mostly state land, north and west of the Jerusalem-Maaleh Adumim road. The planners, based in the planning offices of the Israeli Ministry of Housing, sought to connect Maaleh Adumim – a city that was established east of Jerusalem some 45 years ago, which now has about 48,000 residents – with the Mount Scopus neighborhood under Jerusalem jurisdiction. All Israeli governments, from the time of Yitzhak Rabin to today, have supported the plan, with the understanding that Israeli urban contiguity between Maaleh Adumim and Jerusalem must be sought. This concept is part of the view of Jerusalem and its surrounding Jewish communities as one metropolitan area, known as “Greater Jerusalem.” The center of the E-1 plan is the construction of 3,500 housing units, a commercial area, and a hotel area.
For years, the plan has been severely disputed by the Palestinians’ position, which seeks to prevent what they call “dismemberment of the West Bank and the prevention of Palestinian and urban sovereign contiguity between northern and southern West Bank.” During the Obama administration, the United States sided with the Palestinian position and prevented Israel from building on the site, as long as a final settlement was not formulated.
Contest for ContiguityThe Israeli interest is to establish E-1, while the international community, and in particular, the EU, all seek to block it. They seek free north-south passage for the Palestinians. Israel seeks to create contiguity between the west (Jerusalem) and the east (Maaleh Adumim on the way to the Dead Sea) as part of a Jewish security belt around Jerusalem. Israel is very concerned about Palestinian attempts to impose a separation between Maaleh Adumim and Jerusalem. The concern also extends to a Palestinian construction belt surrounding Jerusalem from the east from which they could launch attacks against Jerusalem; this would return Jerusalem to a state of a “city on the border” (as it was on the eve of the Six-Day War) in a way that would block the possibility of the city’s development eastward. This would create a threat to the Jerusalem-Jericho Road, where Palestinian construction is already encroaching. This road is a major artery of paramount strategic security importance for Israel to transport troops east to the Jordan Valley and then north in the event of war.  Illegal buildings in Khan al-Ahmar along the east-west road to the Jordan Valley. (Wikimedia Commons)
In Israel, there has been an almost total consensus for years about the need to connect Maaleh Adumim to Jerusalem through the construction of E-1 and, in the future, to apply Israeli sovereignty to this area as part of Israel’s permanent borders. Six prime ministers, from Rabin to Olmert, have publicly pledged to build E-1, but with the exception of the construction of the District Police Station in this area, the building has not begun, due to U.S. resistance.
The years that have passed since the initial stages of the program were approved (23 years ago) have resulted in its collapse. Migrant Bedouin tribes and illegal Palestinian construction have reduced the area available for construction. This phenomenon also narrowed the corridor towards Jerusalem, where the main arterial road passes between Jerusalem and Maaleh Adumim and the Jordan Valley. The corridor, originally about two kilometers wide, has been reduced to only one kilometer wide. The route of the separation fence in the Jerusalem area includes Area E-1.
Maaleh Adumim and E-1: The Heart of the Israeli ConsensusA study published in 2009 by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs on the importance and implications of the E-1 plan, written by this author, included statements by Israeli public figures showing just how broad the consensus was on this building plan. Here are some of the statements:
In a video by the municipality of Maaleh Adumim, key personalities have been recorded over the years as they declare allegiance to Maaleh Adumim and to E-1 and explained its importance: Among the speakers:
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Revealed Preference: Countries Accusing Israel of Genocide Don’t Believe It — They’re Helping Israeli Arms Sales Break RecordsStates accusing Israel of genocide continue to entrust their own national security to Israeli weapons, revealing their preferences and true beliefs.By Ben M. Freeman 31August2026 https://honestreporting.com/revealed-preference-countries-accusing-israel-of-genocide-dont-believe-it-theyre-helping-israeli-arms-sales-break-records/  HonestReporting-The-Governments-Condemning-Israel-Are-Buying-Its-Weapons
Key Takeaways
This week, Greece signed the largest defense export contract in Israel’s history. The deal is worth $3.6 billion. It buys Greece an air defense network built by Rafael and Israel Aerospace Industries: David’s Sling to stop ballistic missiles, mobile SPYDER batteries to be stationed on the Greek islands, the Barak MX system, and a national command center modeled on Israel’s own. The Greeks have given it a name. They are calling it Achilles’ Shield.
Five months earlier, Greece bought $750 million of Elbit rocket artillery, and at the time that was the largest deal Israel had ever signed. It held the record until this week.
In between those two signatures, the Greek Prime Minister stood at the United Nations General Assembly and said that no military target, however valuable, could justify the death of thousands of children and the forced displacement of a million Palestinians. Greece sat on the Security Council and put its name to a statement declaring that the use of starvation as a weapon of war is prohibited under international humanitarian law. Greek officials briefed their own press that the Israeli contracts were being slowed down because of how they looked while Gaza burned. Then they signed them.
These purchases show a revealed preference, indicating that the rhetoric about “genocide” isn’t believed by the politicians that utter the accusations. Buying weapons from a state one publicly brands as criminal or atrocious is not how governments behave when they actually believe the charge. If they actually believed the allegations, they would not support the Israeli defense industry. The trust that they place in Israel is indicative of a belief that the state is not actually immoral or criminal.
The ArrangementAcross Europe and Latin America, government after government has accused Israel of genocide, or of war crimes, or of crimes against humanity. Some have gone to the International Court of Justice. Some have severed relations. Some have passed laws with the word “genocide” written into the title. And in the same months, in some cases in the same weeks, those same governments have been buying Israeli weapons.
Israeli defense exports reached a record $19.2 billion in 2025. That was the fifth consecutive record year. It happened during the period of maximum condemnation, when Israel was being called a genocidal state in parliaments across the democratic world. Europe took the largest share of those exports: thirty-six percent.
FinlandTwo days ago, Finland’s public broadcaster revealed that the Finnish Ministry of Defense had quietly locked in a decade of military cooperation with Israel. Finland proposed the extension itself, in early 2024, and asked for ten years rather than the customary five. It runs to 2034. It covers research, development ,and the procurement of defense materiel. The ministry never announced it. It was approved by written exchange, and unlike the previous renewal it was not sent to the Foreign Ministry for assessment.
Early 2024 is after October 7th, after the invasion of Gaza began, after South Africa had filed at the International Court of Justice, and in the months when the accusation of genocide had become a defining feature of European politics.
Finland bought the David’s Sling system in a contract signed on 12 November 2023, five weeks into the war, for around €317 million. Finland was the first export customer for that system in the world. Over the past decade the Finns have bought more than €800 million of Israeli equipment, and this May they hosted thirty-two Israeli defense companies at a seminar in Helsinki. When the Finnish parliament was handed a citizens’ initiative signed by more than fifty thousand people, asking only that Finnish arms purchases be assessed against international humanitarian law, the defense committee recommended rejection and the parliament followed suit. Last week Finland announced it is ending its funding for UNRWA.
And what does Finland say about Israel? The Foreign Minister, Elina Valtonen, was asked on live television what Israel’s conduct in Gaza could be if not genocide. She answered: “Well, quite so.” She has said, of allegations of Israeli forces killing Palestinians seeking food, that if this is not a war crime she does not know what is. The President has called Gaza a man-made famine and that it was shameful.
Her government has never made allegations of genocide its official position. The Finnish cabinet has not said the word. What the Finnish cabinet has done is say everything short of it, in public, repeatedly, while doubling the length of its arms relationship with Israel in private.
The Finnish Defense Minister’s explanation, when the story broke, was that Finland has cooperation documents with forty countries and Israel has long been one of them. Nothing dramatic. Standard practice.
SpainSpain is the case where the contradiction is written into law. In September 2025 Pedro Sánchez announced a package of measures and his own office titled the announcement “measures against the genocide in Gaza.” The decree that followed carries the word genocidio in its statutory title. It bans the export, import and transit of defense material to and from Israel. Spain had already intervened at the International Court of Justice.
Six months later, a Spanish audit found that not a single contract awarded to an Israeli company or its Spanish subsidiaries had actually been canceled, and that €1.208 billion of them remained in force. The ministry had deleted thirty-five contract announcements from its website. Deleting the announcement is not canceling the contract. The decree itself contains a clause permitting the cabinet to authorize transfers anyway, where a ban would harm the general national interest.<
So the Spanish position, stated plainly, is this: Israel is committing genocide, this is the gravest crime in the international legal order, and Spain will continue to buy Israeli missiles where the national interest requires it.
The OthersColombia’s President Gustavo Petro did not merely criticize Israel’s conduct in Gaza. His government intervened in South Africa’s genocide case at the International Court of Justice, and on 1 May 2024 he announced that Colombia would sever diplomatic relations with Israel, describing its government as genocidal. Nine months later, his air force signed a renewed contract with Israel Aerospace Industries to maintain its Kfir fighter fleet, confirmed on the record by the air force chief. Colombia’s jets are Israeli. They do not fly without Israeli engineers. The government was prepared to break relations with Israel over genocide, but not to let its own air force lose the Israeli support on which it depended.
Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said in June 2025 that Israel had crossed a line in Gaza and backed sanctions against it. By September, Denmark was telling the Security Council of starving children, famine and suffering on an “unprecedented scale,” while insisting that Israel comply with international humanitarian law. Yet that same month Denmark approved another 1.5 billion kroner to bring its Israeli-supplied rocket artillery to full operational capability. The government was arguing that Israel should face international pressure for the way it was waging war while spending another 1.5 billion kroner on Israeli technology to strengthen Denmark’s ability to wage one.
Belgium went further still. In December 2025, it formally intervened in South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. Its army had already bought, after October 2023, more than a hundred tonnes of ammunition from an Elbit-owned manufacturer, along with components from Rafael and maintenance from Israel Aerospace Industries. Belgium’s Defense Minister explained the contradiction with a candor his colleagues elsewhere lack. There are no sanctions against Israel, he said. Israel is a very important trading partner.
What the Purchases Prove?These arrangements are fundamentally built on trust. When Greece puts Israeli interceptors on its islands and an Israeli-modeled command center at the top of its military, it is handing the lives of Greek citizens to Israeli engineering, Israeli software, Israeli spare parts and an Israeli supply chain that has to hold in a crisis. Finland did the same thing while sharing a border of more than thirteen hundred kilometers with Russia. That is not a transaction you enter into with a state you believe to be exterminating a people. It is a transaction you enter into with a state you trust more than almost any other, and whose competence you rate above the alternatives.
The comparison that makes it most clear is Russia. When Europe concluded that Russia was a criminal state, Europe did not wait for a ruling from The Hague. It sanctioned, expelled, seized, rearmed, and closed its borders. Finland shut its frontier. Nobody in Helsinki argued that the Foreign Ministry should decline to characterize the invasion of Ukraine until a court had pronounced. And no European government has spent the years since asking Russia to sell its interceptors.
What it Costs?My objection is what the double posture does to the word. “Genocide” is not a rhetorical intensifier. It was built during the Shoah to name the worst thing human beings do to one another, and it was built substantially by a Jewish lawyer who lost his family to it. When a government uses that word, or stands beside it, or lets its parliament and its press carry it, and then signs a decade-long arms partnership with the accused, it tells us the word was never a finding. It was a tool. It cost nothing to pick up, it bought a week of domestic peace, and it was put down when a contract needed signing.
The accusation does not evaporate when the trade press moves on. It settles into the culture. It has become the common sense of the age. It is repeated in lecture halls and on placards and outside synagogues, by people who did not read the decree and do not know about the Kfir maintenance contract, and who have simply been told by their own leaders that the Jewish state is genocidal. Jews in Helsinki, Madrid, Athens and Brussels are then made to answer for it, in their streets, at their workplaces, at the doors of their own communal buildings. They are asked to answer for a charge their governments do not believe strongly enough to forgo an air defense system.
This is not an argument against criticism of Israel. Criticism of any government is legitimate, and Israel’s is no exception. Israelis themselves do it more fiercely than any foreign ministry. The point is that the gravest accusation in international law has been taken up by governments that do not act as though they believe it. They know Israel is not committing genocide. They are betting their cities on it.
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© Divuach Ne’eman R”A, 2025
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Who Pays the Price for the UK’s Potential Settlement Trade Ban?The UK might impose a trade ban on goods produced in Israeli settlements, but the consequences would go beyond its intended target.By Sharon Levy 02September2026 https://honestreporting.com/who-pays-the-price-for-the-uks-potential-settlement-trade-ban/
Key Takeaways:
When UK Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband announced a “comprehensive reset” of the UK’s approach on Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the decision came amid growing international attention over the zoning tender for the E1 area of the West Bank, which moved forward a long-delayed plan for construction between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim. Among the measures the UK is looking to impose is implementing a ban on trade in goods produced in Israeli settlements.
The international community, and the activists who call themselves pro-Palestinian, celebrated the potential of the new policies to supposedly disrupt the process of building on E1 and, in turn, advance the prospects of a two-state solution.
The question of who these new measures would actually help or harm has been almost entirely left out of the picture. Such blanket bans on trade with Israeli settlements could have consequences extending well beyond the settlements themselves.
Against a UK Israeli Settlement Boycott: Recommended Reading
Within Israel, products are not explicitly labeled as to whether they are sourced from the West Bank or a community elsewhere in Israel, meaning that blanket restrictions on goods specifically produced in settlements are almost impossible to execute. A product manufactured in an Israeli settlement can enter the same domestic supply chains as a product manufactured elsewhere in Israel, with both ultimately being exported through the same ports, distributors and retailers.
Some products have warehouses or offices in both the West Bank and within Israel’s internationally recognized borders, making the process all the more complicated. In this case, boycotting an office or warehouse exclusively in the West Bank cannot be implemented without impacting the second office elsewhere in Israel.
In practice, this might mean Israel in its entirety could be subject to UK trade restrictions, as neither Israel nor the UK would be identifying which products come from where.
Beyond the challenges of singling out goods from the West Bank for boycott, it is impossible to ignore who would be negatively impacted by such a trade ban. Prior to October 7, 2023, roughly 165,000 Palestinians worked in Israel and the West Bank. While that number has decreased in the years following, a trade ban would have significant potential negative ramifications on Palestinian workers.
This isn’t purely theoretical. When, in 2014, SodaStream was boycotted for the location of its manufacturing plant in the community of Ma’ale Adumim in the West Bank, the vast majority of those impacted were Palestinian employees. After the production plant was moved to the Negev desert following international pressure, 500 Palestinian workers lost their jobs – jobs which provide higher wages than average in the West Bank alongside employment benefits.
But the potential consequences do not end within the borders of Israel. A settlement trade ban could also have implications for British Jews, particularly if restrictions on settlement goods contribute to a broader environment in which Israeli products, businesses or institutions become increasingly subject to boycotts.
We share concerns about settler violence and extremism. However, there is a deeply troubling question of why Israel is being singled out for this form of economic action. If the government proceeds with this approach, it would be the latest in a series of punitive acts taken towards a supposed ally of this country. The harsh reality is none of these actions have had any influence on the situation on the ground. As Israel approaches pivotal elections on 27th October, we urge the government to carefully consider that the only impact of further interventions will be to embolden extremist factions within Israel. We also urge the government to consider the unintended consequences for our community of the proposals that are being considered. These include the risk of harming the legitimate connection between British Jews and places of great religious, cultural and historic significance, including the Western Wall, Judaism’s holiest site. Broad, untargeted measures may inadvertently become a wider boycott of Israel, giving legitimacy to those who reject Israel’s very existence, and placing increased scrutiny on British Jews at a time when antisemitism in the UK is more prevalent and more violent than ever.  Jewish Leadership Council-tweet-30August2026-The JLC is deeply concerned
The Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Jewish Leadership Council warned that such a boycott could further damage UK-Israel relations and risk creating an even more hostile environment towards British Jews.
If a ban on trade in Israeli settlements goes through, the consequences will undoubtedly be far-reaching. From impacting the very people that the ban is supposedly meant to help, to hurting Jews outside of Israel, the ban would prove to do more harm than good.
These results are not difficult to foresee, making the decision to pursue it driven by policies of activism and double standards. A policy this disingenuous doesn’t advance peace, but it does advance the warped anti-Israel hatred that has too frequently presented itself as genuine concern for Palestinian rights.
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© Divuach Ne’eman R”A, 2025
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European powers condemn Israel’s E1 construction plans in Judea, UK threatens sanctionsAll Israel News Staff | Published: 21August2026
France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany on Thursday jointly condemned the Israeli government’s plans to advance construction in the E1 area of Judea and Samaria, internationally known as the West Bank.
“The decision by the Israeli government to publish bid offers for construction projects within the framework of the E1 settlers’ project is unacceptable,” the four European powers said in a joint statement. The condemnation came after Israel announced plans to market the first 1,400 of 3,412 planned housing units in the Samaria.
The four European governments, like much of the international community, oppose Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria, which they consider “occupied territory” and therefore a violation of international law. Israel rejects that legal position, arguing that Judea and Samaria are disputed rather than occupied.
The British government went further in its condemnation of Israel, with Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband announcing that Britain would prepare new targeted sanctions against Israelis involved in what it described as “illegal settlement expansion” in Gaza and the West Bank.
“The Israeli Government’s launch of tenders for the E1 settlement project is unacceptable and destructive. Britain will not stand back and accept the destruction of the two state solution,” British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband wrote on 𝕏.
The E1 area is considered strategically sensitive because of its location between Jerusalem and the Jewish city of Ma’aleh Adumim, which much of the international community considers an “illegal settlement.”
Critics of Israeli construction in E1 have argued that development there would undermine the geographic continuity of a future Palestinian state. However, even if Israel proceeds with construction in the area, Palestinian Authority-controlled territory would retain geographic continuity east of E1.
From an Israeli perspective, the E1 area is strategically important for strengthening Israel’s control of the Jerusalem area, which Israel considers its undivided capital.
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar responded to Miliband’s criticism by saying he “rejected outright the statement of the UK Foreign Secretary and the patronizing tone of his words.”
“The Jewish people have the right to live throughout the Land of Israel, just as the British have the right to live in London and throughout the United Kingdom,” Sa’ar added.
The Israeli foreign minister also accused the British government of hypocrisy in its criticism of Israel.
“Britain itself still controls colonial territories thousands of miles from its shores. It is absurd for Britain to lecture the Jewish people about where they may live in their historic tiny homeland, when the Jewish people’s connection and right to this land is the most extensively documented of any people in human history,” Sa’ar argued.
Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir went further in his criticism of Miliband.
“Someone should update Ed that the British Mandate for the Land of Israel ended in 1948 and that Israel is an independent state,” Ben Gvir wrote on 𝕏.
“Perhaps instead of playing make-believe about the Mandate era, he ought to look out of the window at his London, which is rapidly turning into an Islamic Caliphate,” he added, referring to the large-scale immigration from Muslim-majority countries to the UK and other Western countries.
Last month, newly elected British Prime Minister Andy Burnham vowed to take a tougher stance against Israel amid growing diplomatic tensions concerning the Middle East conflict.
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Joint Statement UK-EU-Canada Jerusalem E1 and reactions Joint Statement UK-EU-Canada Jerusalem E1 REACTIONS:“Anyone boycotts Israel is boycotted by Florida”35 states have have similar anti-BDS legislation that will bankrupt British Business
It would also end any British business participating in that boycott from doing any business in Florida if it needed any official interaction with state or local government to operate (permits, tax collection). Florida is one of Britain’s largest trading partners. They should understand that their vanity project in support of Muslim terror could cost them billions of dollars. And for those who doubt the power of this policy, it was this same law that broke Airbnb’s misguided effort to boycott portions of Israel in 2019. They realized that this law would have bankrupted their company. Florida has made it clear. Any company — or nation — that boycotts Israel is boycotted by Florida  Congressman Randy Fine-tweet-7September2026-Anyone boycotts Israel is boycotted by Florida
UK to be added to the US IRS international boycott list26 U.S. Code § 999 – Reports by taxpayers; determinations
The United States must make clear that joining this effort comes with consequences. Today, I urged @USTreasury Secretary Bessent to review these boycott measures under Section 999 and add every qualifying country to the international boycott list without delay!
 Rep. Claudia Tenney-tweet-9September2026-international boycott list
Seven Western governments are warning Israel over E1 construction, accusing Jerusalem of undermining a future Palestinian state and even cautioning businesses against participating. Meanwhile, those same European governments are struggling with the consequences of their own border and migration policies — policies that have transformed their societies and fueled intense debates over security, sovereignty and national identity. Europe lectures Israel about preserving the possibility of another state. Israel might reasonably ask Europe a question in return: Who is protecting the future of your own?  Mossad Commentary-tweet-20August2026-israel should be writing the letters
The EU is reportedly preparing sanctions if Israel begins construction in the E1 area, including labeling products from Israel, scaling back academic ties, and halting some security and diplomatic cooperation. Smotrich says he won’t accept “dictates from foreign countries,” while Ben Gvir told Ed Miliband: “someone should update Ed that the British Mandate for the Land of Israel ended in 1948 and that Israel is an independent state.” Smotrich and Gvir are right.  Mossad Commentary-tweet-20August2026-reaction to Joint Statement UK-EU-Canada Jerusalem E1
💡MOSSADIL COMMENTARY: Reports say the EU is preparing sanctions against Israel if construction moves forward in E1, between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim. Israel should look very carefully at Europe’s trajectory before allowing these threats to dictate Israeli policy. Anyone who believes that cancelling E1 will suddenly restore some permanent European-Israeli alliance is fooling themselves. Today it is E1. Tomorrow it will be another neighborhood, another security measure, another military operation, another Israeli government decision. The pressure will not disappear. The demand will simply move. Europe itself is struggling with uncontrolled borders, political radicalization, social fragmentation and increasingly aggressive extremist movements—and yet its governments presume to dictate where Jews may build and what Israel’s future borders should look like. Israel cannot formulate national policy around winning temporary approval from governments that may look very different a decade from now. We are not Europe First. We are not Palestinian First. We are Israel First. We have stood alone before. If necessary, we will stand alone again. Israel’s borders, security and future will be decided in Jerusalem—not Brussels, London or Paris.  Mossad Commentary-tweet-21August2026-Commentary-Joint Statement EU-UK-Canada Jerusalem E1
 Countries that cannot protect their own borders will not tell Israel where to Draw ours
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Statement-on Israeli-Jerusalem-E1 Project-Ed Miliband UK Foreign Secretary Statement-on Israeli-Jerusalem-E1 Project-Ed Miliband UK Foreign Secretary
 Ed Miliband-tweet-19August2026-statemen
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UKLFI warns over proposed settlement trade ban22August2026 / https://www.uklfi.com/uklfi-warns-over-proposed-settlement-trade-ban UK Lawyers for Israel (UKLFI) has warned the UK Government that introducing a ban on trade between the UK and Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem and the West Bank would breach several binding international obligations.  UK House of parliament
The UK Government is actively considering banning trade in goods and services between the UK and areas of Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). It says it has an obligation under international law to impose this ban.
UKLFI has sent a Briefing Paper to the UK’s Foreign Secretary and the Legal Adviser to the UK’s Foreign Office, challenging that position.
The Paper disputes the claim that the UK has a legal obligation to impose a general ban on such trade and argues that, on the contrary, such a ban would contravene the UK’s legal obligations under the UK-Israel TPA, the GATT, the GATS, and (if applied to Northern Ireland) the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to the Brexit Agreement.
At the same time, by harming Israeli businesses in the West Bank that employ Palestinian staff, such a ban would undermine the Palestinian economy and the prospect of a two-State solution.
In addition, such a ban might discourage US investment in the UK, since companies operating in the UK that comply with it would be exposed to potential sanctions under US Federal and State laws.
It would also have the effect of further promoting antisemitism in the UK.
Jonathan Turner, Chief Executive of UKLFI, commented: “Statements made on behalf of the UK Government appear to be the opposite of the correct analysis. There is no international legal obligation requiring the UK to impose a blanket ban on trade with Israeli businesses in East Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria. On the contrary, our analysis shows that imposing such a ban could itself put the UK in breach of several binding international obligations, including the UK-Israel Trade and Partnership Agreement, the GATT and the GATS and, if the ban extends to Northern Ireland, the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to the Brexit Agreement.”
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Israel’s Reaction🇮🇱 SMOTRICH: “WE ARE DONE BEING PASSIVE ACTORS”
Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich says Israel is preparing “very painful responses” against countries threatening sanctions. “Nobody can try and force us to commit suicide through sanctions and economic pressure.” “We are done being passive actors.”  Mossad Commentary-tweet-3September2026-Smotrich-We are done being passive actors
 Smotrich-We are done being passive actors
JerusalemCats Comments: Minister Itamar Ben Gvir’s Statement on moving the Gaza Population can be done in Judea and Sumeria, Same Terrorist & their Supporters.
They haven’t even read the full plan to encourage migration from Gaza, and they’re already saying it won’t happen. Well, fine, they said that about the gun reform too, about the prison reform, about the emergency squads and the National Guard that I established, and also about the death penalty law for terrorists. So what if they said it?! I’m attaching the full plan for you: “Disengagement 710” – a plan that will encourage the voluntary migration of 1.86 million Gazans within seven years. We stopped dealing with the problem. We decided to solve it. For the full plan –  itamarbengvir-tweet-3September2026-We decided to solve it
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Israel’s response to UK – closing British Consulate in JerusalemForeign Minister Sa’ar announces closure of British Consulate in Jerusalem and other countermeasures against UK sanctions.Yitz Goldberg / Published:8September2026, 5:44 PM (GMT+3) / https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/432903
Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar announced on Tuesday that Israel will close the British Consulate in Jerusalem and take a series of additional countermeasures in response to new sanctions announced by British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband.
Sa’ar said the measures were decided upon with the agreement of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and follow what he described as a series of anti-Israel decisions by Britain’s Labour Government.
Under the measures, Israel will close the British Consulate in Jerusalem, remove British representatives from the International Gaza Support Center in Kiryat Gat, terminate British activities training Palestinian Authority forces in Judea and Samaria under the “British Support Team in Ramallah,” and deny entry to Israel to 12 British elected representatives and other British nationals involved in antisemitic and anti-Israel activity or who deny Israel’s existence.
“Unfortunately, a hostile Labour Government is in office, systematically acting against the State of Israel, and it has left us with no choice but to finally respond to its hostile actions,” Sa’ar stated.
The announcement came after Miliband unveiled a series of measures targeting Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria.
Miliband announced that Britain would move to ban trade in goods produced in Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria and impose restrictions on companies and individuals providing services, including construction and financing, for settlement expansion. He also announced further restrictions on arms exports to Israel.
“For a long time, the British government has said such settlements are illegal,” Miliband told the House of Commons. “Today I announce the official view of the British government is that the occupation is unlawful.”
France and Canada joined Britain in announcing that they would introduce national measures banning trade in goods from Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria.
Miliband also criticized Israel’s decision to publish construction tenders for the E1 area and said the British government agrees with the UN definition of ethnic cleansing and believes ethnic cleansing is taking place in parts of Judea and Samaria.
Sa’ar rejected the British accusations and criticized the timing and substance of the measures.
“The accusations made today by the Foreign Secretary of the Labour Government in the British Parliament were outrageous lies,” he said.
“The British move is morally distorted and constitutes blatant interference in the affairs of a sovereign state and in its electoral process,” Sa’ar added.
He also rejected the claims regarding construction in E1, saying that no new decisions had been made on development in the area.
“Contrary to the false claims of the Labour Government, no new decisions have been made regarding development in E1. The decision was taken more than a year ago, and the tender process has been underway for many months,” he stated.
Sa’ar said the Israeli government’s decision included plans for two roads, Road 80 between the Bethlehem and Ramallah areas and the “Fabric of Life” Road between a-Za’im and al-Ezariya, and rejected claims that the plans would sever Palestinian territorial contiguity.
The Foreign Minister also accused the British government of applying a one-sided policy toward Israel while failing to take measures against the Palestinian Authority over its payments to terrorists.
“This conflict will not be resolved through declarations from London or Paris, and a one-sided, anti-Israel approach only pushes the possibility of reaching a solution further away rather than bringing it closer,” he said.
Sa’ar listed a series of measures taken by Britain’s Labour Government since it came to power in July 2024, including its recognition of a Palestinian state, resumption of funding for UNRWA, restrictions on defense exports to Israel, sanctions on Israeli ministers and other Israelis, suspension of negotiations on a free trade agreement, and restrictions on military and security cooperation.
Sa’ar announced that the following UK elected representatives and British nationals will be denied entry to Israel: Jeremy Corbyn MP; Zarah Sultana MP; Fahad Ansari, Director of Riverway to the Sea; Naz Shah MP; Diane Abbott MP; Hannah Spencer MP; Carla Denyer MP; Sian Berry MP; Ellie Chowns MP; John McDonnell MP; Richard Burgon MP and Adrian Ramsay MP.
Announcing the closure of the British Consulate, Sa’ar stressed Israel’s sovereignty over its capital.
“United Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and is under its full sovereignty. Any activity by a foreign state within it must be carried out with the consent of the State of Israel,” he stated.
Sa’ar warned that Israel could take similar steps against other countries that act against it.
“Britain initiated and led the current move. But we will also take countermeasures, at our discretion, against other countries that act or will act against Israel,” he said.
“The message to every government that harms us is clear: whoever acts against Israel, Israel will act against them, and they will lose their influence and relevance in the region.”
“Measures against Israel will not go unanswered,” Sa’ar concluded.
Plausible deniability
AM ISRAEL CHAI.  The Mossad Satirical and Awesome-tweet-8September2026-We are not to be messed with, UK
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Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs https://jcfa.org Understanding Israeli Interests in the E1 Area: Contiguity, Security, and Jerusalemhttps://jcpa.org/understanding-israeli-interests-in-the-e1-area/
Jerusalem and EI area boundaries Why This Study Was WrittenThe Israeli building program known as E1 (East-1), situated between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim, has been on the Israeli and world agenda for twenty years. It is subject to a severe Israeli-Palestinian dispute and prompts strong international opposition. As a result, it has yet to be implemented.
On November 30, 2012, after long years in which Israel had almost completely frozen the program, a scaled-down forum of nine ministers of the Israeli government met and decided to renew the planning, approval, and construction processes in the E1 area. This decision was part of Israel’s reaction to the UN General Assembly resolution on recognizing the State of Palestine as an observer state that is not a full member of the United Nations.
Many countries displayed a total lack of understanding for Israel’s decision and condemned it, sometimes harshly. The White House spokesman, for example, said the program contravened U.S. policy and damaged the chances for a two-state solution. The Israeli ambassadors in Britain, France, Sweden, Spain, and Denmark were summoned for reprimands.1 In addition, fourteen of the fifteen members of the UN Security Council declared that the organization opposed Israel’s plans to build in E1. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said Israel had taken a “dangerous path.”2
At the beginning of January 2013, a group of Palestinians, with the backing of the Palestinian Authority, set up a protest encampment in E1. Israel waited a few days and then, with Supreme Court approval, evacuated it.
The Israeli government and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected the criticism over the decision to build in E1. The Prime Minister’s Office affirmed that Israel would “continue to act in accordance with the vital interests of the State of Israel even in the face of international pressures, and there will be no change in the decision that has been taken.” Israel’s decision was also taken in light of the fact that, according to every past Israeli government, Maale Adumim must be retained by Israel, and the Palestinians have agreed to this in past negotiations. Therefore, the connection of Maale Adumim to Jerusalem needs to be addressed when planning the future of the area.
At the beginning of December 2012, the Supreme Planning Council for Judea and Samaria, part of the Civil Administration, began to implement the government’s decision. It decided to deposit the construction plans for two of the E1 residential neighborhoods for public approval, a significant stage in the succession of approvals that still await the plan. At the last minute, however, an order by the Prime Minister’s Office put a halt to this procedure, and so far the plan has not been deposited for public approval.
This study discusses the E1 plan, its great importance for the State of Israel, and its vicissitudes over the years. It refutes the claim that the plan would hinder the two-state solution, or prevent linkage between the populations of the northern and southern West Bank. It describes the longstanding consensus in Israel about the future of Maale Adumim and the vital link between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim, of which the E1 plan is an integral aspect; the place of the Adumim bloc in the concept of metropolitan Jerusalem; and the place of that concept in Israel’s approach to security and settlement.
The study also explains why avoiding building in E1 is dangerous to Israel’s interests, and likely to result in Maale Adumim and Jerusalem being severed from each other. At the same time, the report strongly criticizes the Israeli authorities’ failure over the years to eradicate the phenomenon of illegal Palestinian building in the area between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem. While this stems from concern for the reaction of the international community, it is gradually constricting Israel’s options in an area so vital for its future integrity.
As the study shows, the E1 area is located in Area C, the portion of the West Bank in which Israel has the powers of zoning and planning according to the Oslo II Interim Agreement. In the last year, the Palestinian Authority has nonetheless undertaken development projects in Area C, some with EU financing. Thus the situation on the ground is not static, and Israel will have to find a way to protect its vital interests, especially in this sensitive area, to the east of its capital. The Essential Points
 Map of 1995 Oslo II Interim Agreement showing eastern approaches to Jerusalem. Areas marked in yellow are “Area B” where the Palestinian Authority has full civilian jurisdiction including zoning and planning authority. White areas in the West Bank are “Area C” where Israel has full security responsibility and civilian authority over zoning and planning. The main connection between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim must clearly run north of Abu Dis and Azariya, which is precisely where E1 is located. Unfortunately, the Palestinians have been building illegally in Area C close to the main road connecting Jerusalem and Maale Adumim, thereby narrowing the corridor between them. If Israel fails to build in E1, the area will be taken over by Palestinian construction.
The Security Component of the Metropolitan Jerusalem ConceptFormer prime minister Yitzhak Rabin said that forgoing the construction of E1 would mean severing Maale Adumim from Jerusalem and probably changing Maale Adumim into what Mount Scopus was from 1948 to 1967. In those years Mount Scopus was an Israeli enclave in the heart of an Arab area. Only a narrow road provided access to it, and Israel was dependent on the mercies of the Jordanian regime and the United Nations to preserve even such a minimal connection. Rabin expressed apprehension that if Israel were to fail to link Jerusalem to Maale Adumim with a continuity of Jewish settlement, the latter city would indeed experience the same fate as Mount Scopus.10 Rabin was the first Israeli prime minister to promote the E1 plan, aimed at creating that very continuity.
In 1996, Shimon Peres, Rabin’s successor as prime minister, discussed with the head of the IDF Central Command, Gen. Ilan Biran, and chief of staff Gen. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, the security-settlement concept regarding Jerusalem. Biran explained, “Without territorial continuity in the areas surrounding Jerusalem, it will be hard to ensure Israeli rule. Everything must be done to create a continuity of Jewish settlement between Maale Adumim to the east, Givat Zeev to the north, and Har Gilo to the south.”The Biran plan spoke, among other things, of paving roads and arteries between all the points of Jewish settlement, thereby creating continuity to the east between Maale Adumim and Mount Scopus (the E1 area), to the north between Givat Zeev and Neve Yaakov, and to the south between Har Gilo and Jerusalem. During the presentation, Biran emphasized that if such Jewish territorial continuity was not created, then the Arab settlement blocs surrounding the capital would create their own continuity and “strangle” Jerusalem.11
In essence, Biran outlined a minimal version of the “defensible borders” doctrine, which is a necessary condition for Israel’s security. A slightly more developed version was presented later by Gen. Yaakov Amidror, formerly head of the Research and Assessment Division of IDF Military Intelligence and currently Israel’s national security adviser.12 He, too, specified the area between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim as vital to defending the country.
In the early 2000s, an extra-governmental team of experts, composed mainly of professionals in the urban-planning and military fields, also recommended to the government that it design the borderline of Jerusalem in a way that would ensure the urban continuity of the Jewish neighborhoods. A secret document that the team submitted to the Sharon government, which at that time became a sort of political master plan for the Israeli leadership, stated:
The recommendations adopted by the political echelon also stated: “One must enable the Palestinian population to maintain a continuous transportation connection between Bethlehem and Ramallah outside the borders of Jerusalem. According to need, use should be made of bridges or tunnels without transferring ownership of the land above the tunnels or under the bridges.”This recommendation is of great importance; it touches directly on the claim that the E1 plan interrupts Palestinian continuity between the northern and southern West Bank, a subjected addressed at length below. Israel’s Need for Strategic DepthIsrael’s need for strategic depth as a component of defensible borders is endorsed today by most Israeli military and security professionals. This strategic depth must include sufficient combat space to deploy defensive forces that will be able to maneuver within it, a reserve force capable of mounting a counterattack if needed, and sufficient distance from the strategic home front.
The area between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem, along with the area to the east in the direction of the Dead Sea, is essential to providing Israel with strategic depth in case of the reemergence of threats to the east. In a time of regional instability marked by regime changes, but also in quieter periods, it is forbidden to dismiss the possibility of an eastern front that threatens Israel again taking shape. Hence, the strategic depth provided by the area from Jerusalem through Maale Adumim to the Dead Sea must be regarded as vital for defending the borders of the State of Israel.
In the 1980s, security officials noted that “the spatial dimension in the security context of defending Jerusalem must be such that it can make a contribution to military victory in time of need.”They further asserted:
Gen. Amidror has noted that, in case of a future war, Israel must ensure Jerusalem’s security in two regards:
The City of Maale AdumimMaale Adumim was established by a decision of the Israeli government in 1977. The cornerstone-laying ceremony for the first residential quarters was held two years later, and three years after that, in 1982, the first residents entered the new neighborhoods. In 1991, the state recognized Maale Adumim as a city, the first Israeli settlement in the West Bank to attain such status since Jewish construction there was renewed in the wake of the Six-Day War. Today Maale Adumim numbers about 40,000 residents. A revision of the city’s master plan carried out in recent years updated its aims. The new population target for the city is 103,000 residents, compared to the previous target of 70,000.
At the same time, because of political constraints and the resulting decrease in construction, the city’s rate of growth in recent years has been very modest. Instead of about 500 housing units per year, in recent years no more than a few dozen new units have been built annually. Location and NatureMaale Adumim is located on about seven square kilometers east of Jerusalem on the Jerusalem-Jericho road, close to the northern Jerusalem neighborhoods of Pisgat Zeev, French Hill, and Ramat Eshkol. The city’s buildings extend to the Judean Desert, 450 meters above sea level. Despite being situated at the edge of the desert, the city and its buildings do not have a desert-like nature. Instead, there are broad boulevards, squares, and numerous wide open public areas. Buildings are constructed in the stone-faced Jerusalem style. Maale Adumim’s dependence on Jerusalem for employment, commerce, culture, and education, and the lack of a significant urban center in the city, make Maale Adumim in many regards a suburb of Jerusalem. The Link between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim15Between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem lie a number of Arab villages: Abu Dis, Azariya, A-Zaim, and Isawiya. The road that connects Jerusalem and Maale Adumim is Highway 1, which ends at the entrance to Maale Adumim. Access to Highway 1 from Jerusalem is in the French Hill area and also via the newer Mount Scopus road. Using that road, one can get from Jerusalem to Maale Adumim in about five minutes. Despite their physical separation, the two cities’ geographic proximity makes them mutually visible. Maale Adumim can be seen clearly from Mount Scopus and the Mount of Olives. From Maale Adumim one can see Jerusalem with the three towers that adorn its skyline: the Hebrew University tower, the Augusta Victoria tower, and the tower of the church in A-Tur.
As noted, Maale Adumim does not provide all the public services that its residents need. There is no hospital in the city. Cultural amenities are relatively limited, and most of the public transportation from Maale Adumim goes to Jerusalem. Hence, Maale Adumim’s residents are to a large extent reliant on Jerusalem, which also contains many of the government offices that residents sometimes need.
In addition, 80 percent of the city’s manpower is employed in Jerusalem. There are, however, also a number of ways in which Maale Adumim serves or will serve the residents of Jerusalem. Among these are the Mishor Adumim industrial zone, where thousands are employed. The garbage dump for metropolitan Jerusalem is also located within Maale Adumim’s jurisdiction and is under its responsibility. This dump is now being shut down. The long-term plan for the area is to establish a center for service, employment, and business in the E1 area that will serve both Jerusalem and Maale Adumim residents. Other Attributes of Maale AdumimMaale Adumim’s jurisdiction extends over about 65,000 dunams. These include residential areas, afforestation areas, an industrial zone, leisure areas, and other locations. Much of the territory within the Maale Adumim master plan cannot be used for residential building. Some of this territory is used for IDF firing ranges; other parts are intended for roads and other public services.
Eighty-three percent of the residents are native Israelis; 81 percent are secular and traditional and 18 percent are religious. Some 8,300 children attend the city’s schools, and 2,000 are in its nursery schools and kindergartens. There are 9,000 residential units in the city.
E1 Area Connecting Jerusalem and Maale AdumimJerusalem and EI area boundaries The E1 AreaThe site known as E1 encompasses an area of about 12,100 dunams (4.6 sq. miles), most of it state land, to the north and west of the Jerusalem-Maale Adumim road. In 1991 during the Shamir government, then-defense minister Moshe Arens signed a document transferring part of this area to the Maale Adumim Local Council.16
In January 1994, the Settlement Subcommittee of the Supreme Planning Council for Judea and Samaria issued a new plan that widened the previous Maale Adumim master plan. This plan constituted the basis for the future E1 plan, and then-prime minister Rabin ordered his housing minister, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, to begin planning a neighborhood to be situated in E1. Since then the planning procedures for the E1 neighborhood have advanced very slowly due to international and Palestinian opposition.
The E1 area extends over the hills between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem, which dominate the main roads in the area.17 E1 includes areas north of Highway 1 (the Jerusalem-Jericho road) and a small piece of land south of it. The boundaries of E1 (in the area designated for industry and commerce) verge on those of municipal Jerusalem. To the southeast, E1 is bordered by Highway 1, Azariya, Abu Dis, and lands of the Jahalin Bedouin tribe. To the west it is bordered by Issawiya, the eastern slopes of Mount Scopus, A-Zaim, and Anata. The northern boundary is Road 437 in the area of the Hizme checkpoint.  View of the E1 area and Maale Adumim (on right) as seen from Jerusalem (Mount Scopus).
Google Earth Map – View from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea Google Earth Map – View from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea
The E1 plan has several parts, not all of which have been approved:
 Maale Adumim (right) and the Israel Police station (left) in the E1 area. E1 is meant to connect Maale Adumim to Jerusalem. The Palestinian Bypass RoadThe main charge of the Palestinians and the international community against Israeli building in E1 is that it will prevent the state of Palestinian from having territorial continuity and a link between the northern and the southern West Bank, thereby thwarting any attempt to arrive at a permanent settlement.
Israel is offering a feasible solution to the problem in the form of a bypass road, which is already partially paved. The route of the completed road will run from north to south, between Jerusalem and the Adumim Bloc, linking the northern West Bank to the southern part as an alternative to other existing roads. The Palestinians reject this solution.  A completed section of the Palestinian bypass road. Its final completion will enable transportation continuity between the northern and southern West Bank, similar to other existing “fabric of life” roads built for the Palestinians.
In September 2007, Israel expropriated 1,408 dunams of the lands of Abu Dis, A-Sawahra a-Sarkia, Nebi Musa, and Khan al-Ahmar for the purpose of paving the bypass road to connect Ramallah to Bethlehem.19 The section of the road from Hizme to the A-Zaim checkpoint has already been paved, at a cost to Israel of close to NIS 300 million, passing through a tunnel under the Jerusalem-Maale Adumim road. Thus the Palestinians can have transportation continuity without breaking Israel’s link between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem.
The road has yet to be completed due to budgetary constraints and opposition by the United States and the Palestinians. The Palestinians fear that paving the road will vitiate their claim about the severance of the northern and southern West Bank, which is at the heart of their campaign against Israeli building in E1. Part of the already-existing bypass road is divided by a wall in the middle, separating Israeli and Palestinian traffic.
The bypass road, when completed, stands to provide a good and fair solution to the problem that the Palestinians raise. Israel cannot accept the opposition to the building of E1 and the bypass road for two main reasons:
In recent years, this has led to the creation of a number of roads that are either for Israeli or Palestinian traffic only. Palestinian communities that supposedly are severed from each other by the presence of Israeli communities are in fact linked by such roads, even if traffic is sometimes restricted for security reasons. Likewise, Jewish communities that seemingly are cut off from each other by existing Palestinian communities are, in fact, connected by roads. Even if this reality is not always convenient for the two sides, they accept it as an existing fact of life.
Linkages of this kind exist, for example, between Jewish communities such as Avnei Hefetz, Einav, and Kedumim; between Kedumim and Yitzhar; from Maale Ephraim and the Jordan Valley to the Tapuach Junction and Ariel; between Ateret, Ofra and Shiloh; between Tekoa and Efrat; between Telem and Adora; and between Gush Etzion and Kiryat Arba. The connection from Jerusalem south to Gush Etzion also passes through the “tunnel road,” part of which has become a transportation corridor through Palestinian communities. After the Oslo accords, numerous bypass roads were paved for the Jewish population. These circumvent Palestinian population concentrations and enable safer movement for Jews, even if, not infrequently, travel time has been lengthened.
Traffic between Palestinian communities and hubs of life and work are subject to security restrictions because of past acts of terror. It will be possible to ameliorate this situation in the future when the security situation permits doing so.
In any case, there is separate Palestinian traffic, for example, on the underpass road between Bidu and el-Jib in the Givat Zeev area. Road 443 between Jerusalem and Modiin, which mostly serves the Jewish population, is crossed by passageways that serve Palestinians only. The old Road 60, running north-south along the central mountain ridge from the Wadi Harima area southward to the Beit El and Ramallah areas, currently serves Palestinians only. The section of old Road 60 from Karmei Tzur in the direction of Halhoul also serves Palestinians only, as does the road eastward from Ofra through Taibe in the direction of Kochav Hashachar and Rimonim, and the passage through Beitin (between Ofra and Beit El). Nor, today, are Jews allowed to travel on the old Jerusalem-Hebron road that passes Solomon’s Pools and Deheishe; only Palestinians may use it.
It is important to emphasize that these separate roads are currently operating and are not “apartheid” roads. Rather, they provide direct and convenient transportation links that enable both Israelis and Palestinians to reach their desired destinations without having to unnecessarily pass through areas that would complicate and lengthen their travel time.
In recent years the IDF has formulated a plan for paving new roads for exclusive Palestinian use. The plan includes parallel roads and roads to replace those now blocked by the separation fence.20
These roads are considered bypass (“fabric of life”) roads. The website of the Military Advocate General’s Office, which frequently has to defend the roads in the Supreme Court, explains that the bypass roads are
A similar concept is embodied by the planned bypass road linking the northern and southern West Bank – the road whose completion the Palestinians now oppose.
It is important to recall that the basic principle of the road as a tool not only for transportation, but also for solving political problems, was initially accepted by the Palestinian Authority. In the framework of the Oslo accords, its representatives agreed to the creation of a “safe passage” between Gaza and the West Bank. That arrangement was not implemented, since Israeli-Palestinian negotiations ran aground. In principle, however, the sides agreed, and have not abjured this agreement, to a land passage from the West Bank to Gaza that would constitute a substitute for territorial continuity. (Although Israel and the Palestinians remain divided on the course and nature of the Israeli presence in the passage, agreement prevails regarding its creation as part of the permanent settlement.)
The bypass road that is planned to enable Palestinian traffic from north to south is not fundamentally different from the safe passage route between the West Bank and Gaza. These two areas of Palestinian settlement, which are relatively distant from each other, would be linked only by a road rather than have territorial continuity. On the safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestinians and the Israelis compromised. The Palestinians gave up land continuity and settlement continuity between Gaza and the West Bank; the Israelis agreed to the creation of a passage that in some ways turned some of its territory into an ex-territory. A similar understanding could be reached regarding the link between the northern and the southern West Bank. The nature of the road, and the traffic arrangements on it, could be decided through negotiations.
Illegal Palestinian Building in the Maale Adumim AreaBy delaying its implementation of the decision to build E1, Israel incurs a double cost. First, the linking of Jerusalem and Maale Adumim, to ensure that this strategic area will remain part of Israel, is yet to be achieved. After years in which a consensus prevailed on keeping this an Israeli territory in the context of the permanent settlement, the delay erodes this national consensus. Second, Palestinian and Bedouin settlement is encroaching on this space all the time, the great majority of it illegal: that is, this Palestinian construction is executed without any building permit. According to the Oslo II Interim Agreement, the territory between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim has been designated as Area C, meaning that the powers of zoning and planning were retained here by Israel. Illegal Palestinian construction enables the takeover of vitally important land, some of it within the E1 area.
Palestinian Construction Encroaching on the Jerusalem-Maale Adumim Highway (1989 vs. 2012) The West Bank town of A-Zaim (at bottom) and the Jerusalem neighborhood of A-Tur (at top) taken in 1989 (left) and in 2012 (right). The photos illustrate how the expansion of Palestinian construction over the years has constricted the area around the Jerusalem-Maale Adumim highway, effectively constricting the corridor connecting these two Israeli cities. This is precisely the challenge Israel faces all along this route including in the area of E-1. Israel has refrained from tackling this phenomenon, particularly because of international pressure and activity by leftist movements that provide support to this illegal settlement activity. Even Israel’s attempt to fulfill the letter of the law and settle the illegal interlopers, after evacuations, within permanent and legal settlement sites – such as the one set up at the end of the 1990s on the outskirts of Abu Dis – has not gone well. More recently, the Bedouins of the Jahalin tribe – who are under the sway of the Palestinian Authority and European organizations – rejected two further Israeli offers to create two additional permanent sites for their settlement, one south of Jericho and the other north of it (most of the Jahalin live in Jericho).
Moreover, some of the interlopers who in the past vacated lands in the area of Maale Adumim-Jerusalem and settled, in an arrangement with the state, at the permanent site in Abu Dis, sold their houses to others and went back to illegal building in their previous area of residence.21  Israel built this permanent community for Bedouin on the outskirts of Abu Dis. Some sold their apartments and returned to illegal construction sites in the Adumim area.
A tour of the area to observe the illegal Palestinian settlement activity reveals the following picture: The Palestinians’ invasion and illegal construction begins within municipal Jerusalem north of Highway 1 at a site called Sha’ar Mizrach. This is mostly Jewish-owned territory occupying about 180 dunams in the Anata area. Although this tract of land has potential for linking Jerusalem to E1, currently the state is not allowing the land’s owners to exercise their ownership and also is not taking action against the illegal Palestinian building there.
A visit to the police station in the heart of E1, looking westward, reveals a further concentration of illegal Palestinian building, widely dispersed on rocky land. There are a hundred buildings made of iron, wood, blocks, and cement, with laundry lines hung between them. Some are covered with cloth, apparently for purposes of camouflage. Also visible are horses, goats, a water tank, and a mobile restroom. Not far away is a smaller cluster of more improvised and temporary structures made of tin, wood, and iron.
Such a “landscape” is typical of many of the dozens of illegal Bedouin-Palestinian outposts in the area. Such concentrations, each having individual structures sometimes numbering in the dozens, can also be found near the sewage purification plant south of Road 437 in E1, and also north of this road, as well as northwest of the Mahane Yishai junction, north of Highway 1.
Not all of these concentrations may be characterized as “spontaneous” building. Sometimes the building is supported by European organizations or by elements associated with the Palestinian Authority – and also, according to military sources, by the PA itself. Not infrequently in these clusters of illegal housing, new, cloth-covered structures appear. One also sees large water containers, and restroom structures of a kind not typical of Bedouin communities.
 Prefab buildings br ought in without permits by Bedouin in the Mishor Adumim area, next to Route 1.
 A water meter installed by Mekorot, Israel’s national water company, next to an illegal Bedouin construction site near Nahal Og.
The areas that are attractive for illegal Palestinian settlement are those along Highway 1. Palestinians from Areas A and B can easily enter and build along this artery. The “magnet” is a spring that never runs dry: the pipeline of Mekorot, the Israeli water corporation. Many hundreds of pirate hookups have already been seen along this pipeline. Whoever travels on the road immediately grasps the situation: there are pick-up points for students and residents at every intersection, tractors that move at slow speed along a major highway, herds of goats crossing the road. The state and the Public Works Authority have invested many millions to build a road of the highest safety standards, a wide highway that connects Jerusalem to the Dead Sea area. Mountains were moved for this purpose; yet if the present process continues, soon this splendid road will wend its way through a large Bedouin village. The state is not dealing with the plague of pirate hookups and theft of water from the Mekorot pipeline; on the contrary, it is passively acquiescing. Recently, Mekorot installed a faucet with a meter, and the PA has been paying for the water that the Bedouins consume.
Another notable phenomenon is the Palestinians’ illegally accessing electricity by linking up to the street-lighting poles along the road, which has become widespread.
Also helping to entrench the illegal permanent presence of the Bedouin in the area is UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency), which provides them with food and winter equipment while tending to their medical needs as if they are refugees. European organizations support the schools the Bedouin have set up and, with help from the PA, supply them with buildings and water containers.  Water tanks at an illegal construction site in the Maale Adumim area, supplied by the humanitarian organization ACF and the European Union.
The Neglect of Illegal Palestinian BuildingThe state does not automatically open files on illegal building in the area. Occasionally it does so, and even issues demolition orders for buildings created without permits. The main problem is reluctance to implement these orders. In almost all cases the transgressors, with the help of various organizations, petition the Supreme Court against the Civil Administration, which issues the demolition and work-stoppage orders. The petitions present supposedly factual claims and various legal claims. The petitioners request that the demolition order be canceled, and succeed in delaying its implementation until the court rules on the petition. Because the demolition of a building is an extreme and irreversible step, the court usually accedes to the request. The judges issue an interim order until making a further ruling, and request the state’s response to the petition.
This is where the problem begins: the state submits repeated requests to defer the date and thereby drags out the case for years, until the patience of the court registrars runs out. The file is then canceled on grounds of inaction, and the interim order blocking demolition remains in force. Hence, in effect, the demolition orders that the Civil Administration issues are nullified, without serious discussion of the petitioners’ claims.
The Civil Administration’s Central Supervisory Unit became aware of this problem and reported in 2006:
The report of the Civil Administration Central Supervisory Unit for 2008 (published in 2009) made similar observations:
The report also states:
The State Attorney’s Office, in addressing these claims in the reports of the Civil Administration Central Supervisory Unit, stated that the policy of the Supreme Court Division reflected the general priorities for enforcement in this sphere.22 In other words, there apparently is no reason to pursue the case in court and have the petition rejected when, in any case, the enforcement authorities (that is, the Civil Administration) have no intention to demolish the buildings because of priorities related to a shortage of resources.
On May 1, 2011, the Supreme Court held a hearing on a petition (Supreme Court 9815/09) submitted by the Regavim movement, calling for the renewal of procedures on all the petitions of this kind that had been canceled or delayed because of inaction, while leaving the interim orders in force. (Regavim is a public movement that works for the preservation of state lands and assets and the prevention of their illegal takeover by various actors.) In the framework of this petition, the positions of the Civil Administration and the State Attorney’s Office were clarified. The discussion allowed the justices to hear the state’s defense against the charges, including an affidavit on the issue by the head of the infrastructures unit of the Civil Administration. The judges ruled that the phenomenon the petition called into question – the suspension of the cases – was no longer occurring and the petition was out of date.23
Yet a further inquiry, based on information obtained through the Freedom of Information Law, revealed that no significant change had occurred in the treatment of the demolition-order cases for illegal structures in the West Bank, in general, and the Maale Adumim area, in particular. According to an inquiry conducted in 2011,24 at that time, in the Supreme Court there were 162 petitions pending that had been submitted by Palestinians beginning in 2008, and on which interim orders had been issued forbidding the Civil Administration to demolish structures built in the West Bank without authorization.
In many cases, it turned out, more than ten consecutive requests had been submitted – in some of the cases, sixteen consecutive requests – to defer the date of the state’s response to the petition. In many instances the Supreme Court registrars had issued four or five warnings before cancellation on grounds of inaction, and in some cases seven such warnings had been issued. In these cases no discussion was held on the petition, the state having refrained from submitting its response to the petition and to the interim order. In such cases the interim order remains in force and, in effect, prevents the demolition. The upshot of these cases, like hundreds of others, is the effective cancellation of hundreds of demolition orders against illegal Palestinian building that have been issued in the West Bank, in general, and in the Maale Adumim area, in particular.  Illegal building by Bedouin next to Route 1
The Role of the State Attorney’s OfficeThe State Attorney’s Office is deliberately delaying action on these demolition orders. This behavior may be explained in statements by former Deputy Attorney General Malkiel Blass, written in the name of the attorney general, on April 11, 2009, in response to an earlier petition by the Regavim movement.
In his letter, the deputy attorney general writes that he has not found any problem in the state attorney’s conduct when declining to renew the procedures in the demolition cases for illegal Palestinian building. Blass explains that “in the area of planning and construction in Israel and the West Bank, there is a gap between the quantity of the demolition orders for structures that were not built according to the law, and the actual implementation of the demolitions,” and that “under these circumstances there is a need to determine orders of priority for carrying out the demolitions.” In the West Bank, he notes, “the considerations are quite complex….The attorneys are not the ones who set the priorities in carrying out
the demolition and many state authorities are involved in setting the order of priorities.” In sum, he states that “the issue requires the consideration of many other officials in the Israeli public administration and it is more complex than the consideration accorded by the attorneys in their handling of a certain case.”
A possible explanation is that political considerations are preventing the demolition of the illegal structures. Presumably, the root cause is pressure from the international community. In other words, Israel does not have the political latitude to demolish hundreds of illegal structures in the Adumim area and thousands more elsewhere in the West Bank. The Palestinian population is, of course, well aware of this reality, leading to still more illegal construction.
Because of pressure by groups like Regavim and various publications in the media, the state’s longstanding policy of avoiding demolition of illegal buildings has moderated somewhat in recent years. Yet the state is still far from dealing effectively with even half of these violations. On November 15, 2011, a meeting was held by the director of the Supreme Court Division of the State Attorney’s Office, attended by the head of the Civil Administration, the director of the Civil Administration Central Supervisory Unit, and representatives of the attorney general, to discuss the state’s position on cases (which were submitted to the Supreme Court) where work-stoppage and demolition orders were not implemented. It was decided that in such cases court injunctions should be issued “in accordance with the orders of priority of the responsible parties.”25
Nevertheless, in an event covered extensively in the media,26 when in January 2013 members of the Palestinian “Popular Committees” set up a protest encampment in E1, after the government’s decision to advance the planning processes for construction there, the state acted quickly, with the approval of the Supreme Court, to evacuate the encampment.
Over the years this situation, in which Israel has had difficulty coping with extensive illegal building, has reduced the width of the corridor between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim from about two kilometers approximately fifteen years ago to one kilometer and even less at present. This also constricts the possibilities for building in E1 and the adjacent areas.
Security officials, who concur with this assessment, warn that if Israel does not take significant steps to stop the Palestinian takeover of these areas, in the future it may be impossible to carry out the E1 plan as envisaged, particularly in the northwestern area that abuts Anata. Security officials believe that some of the Bedouin migration into the E1 area stems from fear of being left outside the route of the separation fence, which is intended to incorporate the Adumim bloc (including E1) into Israeli territory.
From an Israeli standpoint, then, the E1 building plan is virtually the only obstacle to the endeavor described in Nahal’s plan, since the international community does not allow Israel to act extensively and effectively against the illegal-building phenomenon. Over the years the Palestinians, for their part, have not concealed their goal of preventing Israeli building in E1. Faisal Husseini, the Jerusalem-based Palestinian leader who died in 2001, stated forthrightly that unauthorized building in the Jerusalem area was one of the Palestinians’ weapons in the struggle against Israel.27 As far back as 1993, Muhammad Nahal, an expert in urban planning at the Institute for Arab Studies that was part of Orient House, prepared a plan for the construction of three cities in the Jerusalem area that would surround the Jewish neighborhoods built in the Jerusalem area after 1967. One of the cities that Nahal planned was supposed to occupy lands of the villages of Azariya and Abu Dis, and its purpose was the encirclement of Jerusalem from the east.28
While Ehud Barak was prime minister, the Palestinians indeed formally requested that the E1 area be transferred to their control as part of Area B (where they have full civilian rule while security control remains in Israel’s hands). Their request was refused.29 At present, the Palestinian Authority provides support to illegal building, in general, and in the Maale Adumim area, in particular. In an event held at the illegal building site known as Khan al-Ahmar, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad called the residents “the Bedouin land guardians.”30
After Israel evacuated the protest encampment at E1 in January 2013, the Fatah movement called this dismantlement a “crime” and averred that “this is not the end of the campaign to assert the Palestinian right to all of the Palestinian lands.”31
Maale Adumim and E1: The Heart of the Israeli ConsensusDuring a Knesset session on October 5, 1994, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin declared: “United Jerusalem would also encompass Maale Adumim as well as Givat Zeev as the capital of Israel under Israeli sovereignty.” Six months earlier, in April, it was Rabin who submitted the documents for the annexation of E1 to Maale Adumim Mayor Benny Kashriel.32 After Rabin’s assassination, Prime Minister Shimon Peres reaffirmed the government’s position that Israel would claim the application of Israeli sovereignty to Maale Adumim in the framework of a permanent settlement.33
At the beginning of April 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon stated: “E1 is a plan ten years old, and the aim is to continue it.”34 Likewise, the defense minister in the Sharon government, Shaul Mofaz, said during a tour of E1 that he supported the plan to create Jewish continuity between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim.35 A public information video by the City of Maale Adumim36 shows major figures, over the past decade, affirming their belief in Maale Adumim and E1 and explaining their significance:
In past Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the Israeli team insisted on Israel retaining E1 and the connection between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim. This was also part of the peace proposal made by former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to Mahmoud Abbas.
Israeli Diplomatic Behavior on the E1 Issue: A Dual Message?Along with the frequent declarations of commitment to Maale Adumim and the E1 building plan, all recent prime ministers have acceded to requests by U.S. administrations and agreed to freeze, or to coordinate with the United States, the actual building in E1. Israeli leaders, too, after announcing that the planning processes for E1 would go forward, made clear that the plan had not yet reached the implementation stage.
This dual behavior pattern is marked by a built-in contradiction. On the one hand, domestic audiences hear the message that Israel is going to build E1, a location extremely vital to the country’s interests. On the other hand, world leaders receive another message through private diplomatic channels – that Israel will meanwhile heed the position of the international community. This behavior inevitably makes it very difficult for Israel to respond to international and Palestinian protests against the E1 plan.
The result on the ground is that the plan is not implemented, and despite the talk of “advancing” it, it has not even approached the implementation stage. Even after the December 2012 decision of the Supreme Planning Council for Judea and Samaria to deposit the plan for public approval (a decision not yet carried out), a long path still lies ahead. Many months must pass until the public-approval process is completed. The council then has to decide whether to accept all of the objections that are raised, reject all of them, or accept some of them. Assuming that the plan passes, the council then has to authorize it. Only then can the Housing Ministry prepare tenders for marketing the land for construction. Publication of the tenders also requires approval by the political echelon.
The Palestinian Decision to Fight over E1It was immediately after the Taba talks in January 2001 that the Palestinians decided to fight the E1 plan and recruit the world to the struggle. During the talks, Israel showed the Palestinian delegation a map of Maale Adumim that included the E1 area. Up to that time, the Palestinians had tended to agree to Israeli annexation of most of the settlement blocs, including Maale Adumim, in the context of territorial swaps. The Israeli assertion that the Maale Adumim bloc included E1, as well as land further east toward the Dead Sea, prompted a shift in the Palestinian position, and they retracted their prior agreement regarding Maale Adumim.37
The 2001 Taba talks, then, were the point at which E1 became a red flag for the Palestinians, even though previously they had not opposed it. And they indeed were able to harness the international community to their cause. Nevertheless, the dual message of the Israeli leadership – on the one hand, strong declarations on E1; on the other, delays and deference to the international community – has made it very hard to realize the supreme Israeli interest in building E1.
Already in Rabin’s day, Israel had refrained from carrying out the construction plans for the area because of an understanding with the Clinton administration that its fate would be determined in negotiations.38 Netanyahu, in his first term, tried to promote the plan and even initiated a decision to create a joint municipality for Jerusalem and the settlements surrounding it, but this too was stymied by U.S. opposition. Prime Minister Barak also spoke in favor of continuity and linking Jerusalem and Maale Adumim, but he allowed Israel’s negotiating team to discuss the future of this area in the framework of the permanent-settlement negotiations with the Palestinians.
The prime minister who succeeded Barak, Ariel Sharon, also supported continuity between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim and building in E1, but he, too, came up against U.S. opposition and in fact promised not to build there without coordinating with Washington. As his close adviser Dov Weisglass described it, there was never an Israeli commitment not to build, but it was agreed that such building would be announced in advance and carried out in coordination with the Americans.39
It was Sharon’s successor, Ehud Olmert, who gave the United States an explicit undertaking on this matter. In an interview to the Jerusalem Post in September 2005, Olmert publicly confirmed that Israel had promised the U.S. administration it would not build between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem. “The State of Israel made a commitment to freeze construction…therefore, we would be acting irresponsibly if we were to build there.” At the same time, Olmert, too, emphasized that this did not mean the plan had come to an end. He made similar statements to Mayor Kashriel of Maale Adumim in meetings held in recent years.
Conclusions
* * *
1. Barak Ravid and Natasha Mozgobia, “The United States Harshly Condemns the Intention to Build in E1,” Ha’aretz website, December 3, 2012 (in Hebrew). 2. “Catherine Ashton: ‘The Building around Jerusalem Is Unprecedented,’” Maariv-nrg website, December 20, 2012. 3. A dunam is equal to one thousand square meters, or roughly one-fourth of an acre. 4. See the video by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, “Indivisible Jerusalem,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=98DMPOC-dUQ. 5. Conference on settlement and security with the participation of members of the Settlement Division of the Jewish Agency, security officials, and those involved in the planning of settlements, held at the Jewish Agency at the end of the 1990s. 6. For elaboration on this concept, see the report “Metropolitan Jerusalem: Master Plan and Development,” prepared for the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Housing, the Israel Land Administration, and the City of Jerusalem, 1994 (in Hebrew). Research team headed by Shmarya Cohen and Adam Mazor in cooperation with the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. Nadav Shragai, “Jerusalem: The Dangers of Division,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2008, pp. 24-25. 7. Maia Hushan et al., “About Your Data,” Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2012, p. 7 (in Hebrew). 8. The data are based on the book by Aryeh Hess, Jerusalem and Her Daughters, self-published, 2009, pp. 28-30 (in Hebrew). However, the numbers were updated with the help of the database of the Interior Ministry and the relevant local and regional councils, and they are accurate as of the end of 2011. 9. Shragai, “Jerusalem,” pp. 24-25. 10. See, e.g., statement by former Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin on words in this spirit by Rabin and past leaders of the Labor Party, on the Megaphone site, article by Zvi Singer, “The Government Unanimously Rejected the UN General Assembly Resolution,” December 2, 2012 (in Hebrew). 11. Yossi Levy, “Gen. Biran: Only Territorial Continuity Surrounding Jerusalem Will Ensure Israeli Control,” Maariv, February 25, 1996, p. 15 (in Hebrew). 12. For elaboration on the issue of defensible borders in general and in the area east of Jerusalem in particular, see “Defensible Borders: A Necessary Condition for Israel’s Security,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2005, article by Yaakov Amidror, “Israel’s Requirements for Defensible Borders,” and the appendix: “Military-Strategic Aspects of the Topography of Judea and Samaria for Israel’s Security” (in Hebrew; versions in English also available). 13. Appendix 7 of “Jerusalem: Links and Borders,” prepared by a professional team for the Ministerial Committee for Jerusalem Affairs during the 1980s (in Hebrew). 14. A lecture by Gen. Yaakov Amidror at the Lander Institute in 2007, at a conference on the unity of Jerusalem. 15. The facts presented at the beginning of this section are based on a survey prepared by the engineer of the Maale Adumim municipality, Gadi Brandeis. 16. Regulations Concerning Local Councils (Exchange of Maps) (Maale Adumim), 1991. Cited in Shmuel Berkovitz, The Wars over the Holy Places (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute and Hed Arzi, 2000), p. 171 (in Hebrew). 17. Map of the E1 plan. 18. From Protocol of the District Committee of Jerusalem No. 2011005, April 5, 2011 (in Hebrew). 19. Akiva Eldar, “Israel Expropriated Lands of Four Villages in the West Bank,” Ha’aretz, October 9, 2007 (in Hebrew); Aluf Benn, “The United States Demanded Clarifications on Israel’s Intention to Expropriate Palestinian Lands in E1,” Ha’aretz, October 14, 2007 (in Hebrew). 20. See “Paving Alternative Roads for Palestinians,” website of the B’Tselem organization, January 1, 2011 (in Hebrew). 21. Sources in the Civil Administration. 22. Response of the State Attorney’s Office, February 25, 2009, to the director of the Supreme Court Division (in Hebrew). 23. Ruling of Justices Beinisch, Grunis, and Hayut, Supreme Court 9815/09, January 5, 2011 (in Hebrew). 24. Letter by Amir Fisher, attorney for Regavim, to the director of the Supreme Court Division of the Justice Ministry, Attorney Osnat Mandel, December 25, 2011 (in Hebrew). 25. From the response of the State Attorney’s Office, December 18, 2011, to the request of the Regavim movement to participate in Supreme Court Case 9715/07 (in Hebrew). 26. See, e.g., Chaim Levinson, “The Police and the IDF Evacuated within Hours the Palestinian Encampment Set Up in E1,” Ha’aretz, January 14, 2013 (in Hebrew). 27. Husseini said at the time: “The most important Palestinian activity at this time is construction and even without a license.” See Nadav Shragai, “Jerusalem Is Not the Problem but the Solution,” in Moshe Amirav, ed., Mr. Prime Minister: Jerusalem (Carmel and the Floersheimer Institute, 2005) (in Hebrew). 28. A report in the local paper Jerusalem during that period. See also in Hagai Huberman, “The Battle forMevasseret Jerusalem,” Makor Rishon, December 14, 2007 (in Hebrew). 29. Huberman, ibid. 30. Yariv Mohar, “Palestinian-Bedouin Gesture in Appreciation of Human Rights Activists,” Mahlaka Rishona, May 16, 2011, https://www.news1.co.il/Archive/003-D-59703-00.html (in Hebrew). 31. “Fatah: Evacuation of the Outpost at E1 – A Crime,” website of Reshet Bet, Israel Radio, January 13, 2013 (in Hebrew). 32. Huberman, “Battle for Mevaserret Jerusalem.” 33. Protocol, meeting between Peres and Benny Kashriel, January 24, 1996 (in Hebrew). 34. Natan Guttman, “Sharon: We Will Continue the Project to Link Jerusalem to Maale Adumim,” Ha’aretz, April 5, 2005 (in Hebrew). 35. Nadav Shragai, “Mofaz: A Continuity of Settlement between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim,” Ha’aretz, March 3, 2003 (in Hebrew). 36. The video’s title translates to “Caution: They Want to Strangle Her.” 37. Ir Amim, position paper, December 2012, p. 4 (in Hebrew). 38. According to a minister in Rabin’s government. 39. Shomo Tzena, “Misunderstanding,” Israel Hayom, December 7, 2012 (in Hebrew)
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E1, Jordan, PA (Fatah) & peaceJerusalemCats Comments: Will the PA-Fatah make peace? Jordan’s long-term stability cannot be taken for granted.
The E1 debate is not just about West Bank settlement construction – it’s about security – opinionUS policymakers should stop treating E1 as an Israeli-Palestinian real-estate dispute. It is about who controls the roads, high ground, and military corridors in Israel.By ERIC R. MANDEL 5SEPTEMBER2026 16:10
Twenty-nine Democratic senators have demanded that Israel halt proposed construction in the E1 area between Jerusalem and Ma’aleh Adumim, an Israeli city of 40,000 people.
E1 has long been a lightning rod for advocates of Palestinian statehood, who argue that Israeli construction would sever the Ramallah-Bethlehem corridor and destroy the contiguity of a future Palestinian state. But any viable Palestinian state would likely require tunnels, bridges, or dedicated roads to connect separated areas. Moreover, E1 lies in Area C, where Israel retains planning and zoning authority under the Oslo framework, despite international opposition.
Still, I believe building in E1 now is ill-timed. Israel’s most important ally, the United States, is already grappling with growing anti-Israel sentiment and antisemitic intimidation from the Democratic Left and the conspiratorial Tucker Carlson Right. Israel gains little by creating another unnecessary political confrontation with Washington at this time.
But Washington is asking the wrong question about E1.
The Democratic senators wrote, “The United States must remain committed to a two-state solution that delivers lasting peace and security for both the Jewish, democratic State of Israel and for a future Palestinian state.… development in E1 would seriously jeopardize the prospects for a Palestinian state.”
Their call for Israel’s security and a Palestinian state deserves more scrutiny.
Obstacles toward Palestinian stateThe obstacles to Palestinian statehood did not begin with E1. They began with the Arab rejection of two states in 1948 and their subsequent refusals for a state in 1967, 2000, 2001, and 2007-08, the last offered Palestinian sovereignty in Gaza and nearly all of the West Bank, with a Palestinian capital in east Jerusalem.
Underlying those failures is a question those American policymakers too often avoid: whether Palestinian society is prepared to accept a permanent Jewish state anywhere between “the river and the sea.”
After October 7, that question can no longer be treated as theoretical.
The real E1 debate should not be whether Israelis can build homes there. It should be whether Israel could ever safely relinquish security control of this strategically critical corridor.
Highway 1 runs east from Jerusalem, past Ma’aleh Adumim and E-1, toward the Jordan Valley. It is an essential artery connecting Israel’s major population centers on the coast with its eastern frontier, and provides a vital route for rapidly moving troops, weapons, and supplies toward Israel’s longest border with Jordan.
That matters because Jordan’s long-term stability cannot be taken for granted.
The Hashemite monarchy remains an important American and Israeli security partner, but Jordan is economically fragile and faces significant demographic and Islamist ideological pressures. American and Israeli strategists must contemplate the possibility that over the coming decade Jordan could face increased Sunni Islamist influence, Iranian destabilization efforts, or serious internal disorder.
If that happens, Israel’s eastern frontier could rapidly transform from one of its quietest borders into one of its most dangerous.
During visits with Israeli military personnel and intelligence officials, I saw firsthand the concern about weapons and narcotics smuggling across Israel’s eastern frontier. Weapons entering Judea and Samaria, the West Bank, can strengthen an already formidable Hamas and other armed groups’ presence, operating only miles from Israel’s major population centers.
Today, Israel is confronting increasing tensions inside the West Bank. Israeli security officials have warned repeatedly about the potential for significant escalation.
The Netanyahu government deserves criticism for failing to adequately restrain extremist Jewish violence. Those who attack Palestinians violate Israeli law and should be prosecuted. A future Israeli government should enforce the law aggressively.
But Jewish extremism is only one part of a much larger security problem. For decades, Palestinian Authority schools, official media, and religious institutions have promoted incitement and narratives that reject any Jewish sovereignty, while the PA’s notorious “pay for slay” system has financially rewarded terrorists and their families, incentivizing violence that makes territorial compromise increasingly dangerous.
This brings us back to E1.
There are actually two separate questions that Washington has mistakenly conflated.
The first is whether Israel should build in E1 today. I believe it should not. With an election approaching, beginning construction looks more like a political gesture to the Israeli Right than an urgent security requirement.
The second question is far more consequential: Should E1 ever come under Palestinian security control?
E1 sits alongside a vital corridor connecting Jerusalem and Israel’s coastal population centers with the Jordan Valley. The valley constitutes Israel’s eastern strategic barrier and could become dramatically more important if Jordan is destabilized.
October 7 fundamentally changed Israeli security doctrine. Israelis learned at catastrophic cost what happens when hostile armed organizations are allowed to build military infrastructure adjacent to Israeli communities. Israel cannot repeat that mistake on a vastly larger front.
American policymakers should stop treating E1 as an Israeli-Palestinian real-estate dispute. It is who controls the roads, high ground, and military corridors Israel will need in the next war to the east.
That makes E1 fundamentally a question of strategic depth, military mobility and Israel’s ability to defend its eastern frontier, not simply another argument about settlements.
The writer is the director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network, and is the senior security editor of The Jerusalem Report. He regularly briefs members of Congress, their foreign policy staffers, and the State Department.
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USAID report finds more than 100 UNRWA employees participated in Hamas atrocities on Oct. 7The agency referred a former United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees school teacher and Hamas operative for debarment for allegedly receiving and holding civilian hostages beginning on October 7, 2023.By Misty Severi Published: August 26, 2026 8:25pm https://justthenews.com/world/usaid-report-finds-more-100-unrwa-employees-participated-hamas-atrocities-oct-7
The United States’ Agency for International Development’s Inspector General’s office announced Wednesday that it has referred more than 100 current or former employees of a United Nations relief agency to the State Department over their participation in the October 7 terror attacks in Israel.
The referrals include three people they suggested be debarred by the department, including a former United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees school teacher and Hamas operative who allegedly received and held civilian hostages beginning on October 7, 2023.
The agency did not give a full number of employees it referred, but said its investigation has resulted in one total debarment so far, after the individual was found to have coordinated communications with other suspected Hamas members during the terror attacks while serving as an UNRWA school principal.
Another individual was referred to the department for debarment, but records indicated the individual was deceased, and the proposal was withdrawn.
The new referrals come after the U.S. agency, which the Trump administration closed down last year, found in March that 14 UNRWA employees have been linked to Hamas.
More referrals to the State Department are expected, as well as potential criminal referrals to the Department of Justice.
Misty Severi is a news reporter for Just The News. You can follow her on X for more coverage.
 Office of Inspector General USAID logo.png INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY: USAID OIG’s Ongoing Investigation Leads to Proposed Debarments of Two Former UNRWA Staff for Links to Hamas and One for Links to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad26August2026 https://oig.usaid.gov/node/8198
USAID OIG, a statutorily independent law enforcement and oversight entity, continues to investigate UNRWA staff linked to Hamas and other U.S. designated terrorist organizations. As part of this ongoing investigation, USAID OIG has referred over 100 current or former UNRWA staff for participation in the October 7 terrorist attacks in Israel and/or affiliation with Hamas to the U.S. Department of State for independent review of the evidence and consideration of suspension and/or debarment action. Of those referred, three have recently been proposed for debarment by the Department.
The individuals proposed for debarment include:
A fourth individual, Faisal Ali Al-Naami, was also proposed for debarment. However, records indicated the individual was deceased, and the proposal was terminated. Al-Naami was a former UNRWA social worker and Hamas military communications operative who allegedly participated in the kidnapping of a civilian from Kibbutz Be’eri on October 7, 2023.
This ongoing investigation has already resulted in the government wide debarment of Hafez Mousa Mohammed Mousa, an operative of the Hamas East Jabaliya Battalion, who was found to have coordinated communications with other suspected Hamas members during the October 7 attacks while serving as an UNRWA school principal. That action represented the first known debarment by the U.S. of a terrorist affiliated with a UN agency responsible for humanitarian assistance programming.
Additional referrals to the Department of State are expected, as well as potential criminal referrals to the Department of Justice.
It remains USAID OIG’s investigative priority to ensure that U.S.-funded humanitarian assistance does not fall into the hands of foreign terrorist organizations, depriving assistance from reaching civilians in need. In support of this effort, USAID OIG, with its unique global oversight capacity, has significant ongoing investigative work aimed at preventing the recirculation of terrorist-affiliated actors across U.S.-funded aid organizations, including UN entities.
For more on USAID OIG’s investigative results and ongoing work, please visit https://oig.usaid.gov/our-work/investigations.
To confidentially report fraud, corruption, or diversion of aid, please visit https://oig.usaid.gov/report-fraud.
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Study: Academic Bias Shaped International Law’s Israel ConsensusAvraham Russell Shalev argues that legal journals, conferences and professional networks helped create a self-reinforcing framework while marginalizing Jewish and Zionist perspectives.
Jewish Onliner
 Academic Bias Shaped International Law’s Israel Consensus
On September 2, Israeli legal scholar Avraham Russell Shalev released a forthcoming paper arguing that the international legal consensus shaping many judgments about Israel has developed within an academic environment that Shalev argues systematically marginalizes Jewish and Zionist perspectives.
In his forthcoming paper From Blogs to Boycotts: Anti-Zionist Biases in Legal Academia, Shalev examines how international-law journals, conferences, professional networks and academic platforms help create the “expert consensus” later invoked by international institutions.
His central argument is not simply that individual scholars hold anti-Israel views. Rather, he argues that the infrastructure producing international-law expertise has developed institutional mechanisms that marginalize Jewish and Zionist perspectives, allowing a narrow ideological framework on Israel to become embedded as a dominant interpretation within parts of international legal discourse.
The paper examines controversies involving Opinio Juris, the Columbia Law Review, the Leiden Journal of International Law and what Shalev describes as informal “grey boycotts” against Israeli scholars.
The international law academy functions like a Cathedral, issuing condemnation after condemnation against Israel, while appealing to the authority of a supposed consensus of experts. All of the “experts” agree that Israel is committing war crimes, genocide, apartheid, etc — except for the experts who can’t get published because they disagree with the bon ton. My paper details: By purging Zionist Jews from international legal scholarship, the IL academy builds the intellectual basis for the weaponization of the law and the further marginalization of Jews and the Jewish state. Link in first comment –  Russell A. Shalev-tweet-2September2026-From Blogs to Boycotts
The Battle Before the CourtroomInternational legal campaigns involving Israel often rely on claims of expert consensus. Arguments about occupation, proportionality, self-defense, genocide and state responsibility frequently cite academic commentary and legal scholarship as evidence that a particular interpretation represents mainstream international law.
That influence is recognized within the international legal system itself. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice identifies “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations” as a subsidiary means for determining legal rules.
Shalev argues that this creates an overlooked power center: the academic institutions that determine which scholars, arguments and interpretations receive legitimacy.
When certain perspectives are excluded from journals, conferences and professional networks, he argues, the resulting consensus can become self-reinforcing and influence the legal positions adopted by international bodies.  Article 38-International Court of Justice Credit: International Court of Justice (ICJ)
From October 7 to the Legal NarrativeA central focus of the paper is the reaction of parts of the international-law community following Hamas’ October 7 massacre.
Shalev examines international-law blogs such as Opinio Juris, arguing that some platforms have provided space for scholars whose responses to October 7 framed Hamas’ attack through anti-colonial theory while leaving Zionist perspectives underrepresented.
One example discussed by Shalev is an October 2023 Opinio Juris post by legal scholar Mohsen al-Attar responding to an interview with Professor Noura Erakat. The discussion situated October 7 within a broader anti-colonial framework and referenced Frantz Fanon’s argument that “decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon.”
The post also included an addendum published after October 7 that continued discussing the conflict through the lens of anti-colonial struggle. Critics argued that the framing risked treating Hamas’ attack primarily as an anti-colonial event rather than confronting Hamas’ deliberate targeting of civilians and the scale of the atrocities committed during the attack.
University of Haifa legal scholar Yahli Shereshevsky later criticized elements of the response within international-law circles, arguing that some reactions reflected a failure to fully acknowledge the nature of the October 7 attacks.
For Shalev, the episode represents a broader pattern: legal discourse surrounding Israel often begins from frameworks of colonialism, oppression and state violence while placing less emphasis on Israeli security concerns, Hamas terrorism and the legal obligations of non-state armed groups.
The Institutions Defining Acceptable DebateShalev also examines the controversy surrounding the publication of Rabea Eghbariah’s article Toward Nakba as a Legal Concept in the Columbia Law Review.
The article became controversial after the journal acknowledged that it had been commissioned and did not undergo the journal’s standard review process.
Shalev argues that the episode reflected a broader asymmetry: arguments challenging Israel’s legitimacy often gain access to prestigious academic platforms, while scholars defending Israel or contesting dominant narratives face greater professional barriers.
The paper also discusses cases involving Israeli scholars whose submissions were rejected or altered during publication processes, including Anne Herzberg and Tal Mimran.
Shalev also examines the controversy surrounding the Leiden Journal of International Law. He argues that the journal’s decision to add a disclaimer to an article by Israeli authors after criticism on social media reflected broader concerns about the treatment of Israeli scholars publishing on Israel-related issues.
The “Grey Boycott” of Israeli ScholarsBeyond formal publication decisions, Shalev focuses on what he calls “grey boycotts”: informal professional practices that isolate scholars without requiring an official boycott policy.
The paper highlights the 2018 controversy involving legal scholar Eugene Kontorovich at a conference hosted by the Asser Institute in The Hague.
Critics of Kontorovich’s scholarship on Israel and disputed territories, including Dr. Valentina Azarova and Professor Ralph Wilde, called on organizers to reconsider his invitation. When organizers refused to withdraw the invitation, Shalev argues that critics pursued informal forms of professional distancing from him.
The paper also discusses the case of Israeli scholar Daphné Richemond-Barak, an expert on underground warfare, whom Shalev cites as an example of the barriers Israeli scholars can face in international academic and policy settings.
Shalev further argues that Jewish and Israeli scholars have faced both explicit and informal exclusion from conferences, professional networks and academic spaces.
A 2024 survey by the Israel Young Academy and AFIK surveyed 1,015 Israeli senior faculty members and found that 32% reported significant damage to international collaborations and 26% reported difficulties presenting at international conferences.
The Question of Who Produces “Expert Consensus”The battle over Israel at international institutions does not begin when judges issue rulings or diplomats draft resolutions. It begins earlier, in the academic journals, conferences and professional networks that determine which legal theories gain authority and which scholars shape the boundaries of accepted debate.
Shalev’s central argument is that the struggle over Israel in international law is fought upstream, before court filings and diplomatic resolutions, through the institutions that determine which scholars, concepts and arguments acquire academic legitimacy.
His paper argues that before legal arguments reach courts, governments or international institutions, they are first filtered through the academic ecosystem that determines which scholars, concepts and interpretations receive authority.
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Europe in Free Fall by Guy Millière
 Europe’s erasure as a civilization is underway. Europe is on a path toward rapid, widespread decline — potentially irreversible. It is already extremely late in the day. Unless drastic actions are taken to reverse firmly entrenched trends, European civilization, simply demographically, will soon be part of the past. (Image source: iStock)
On February 14, 2026, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio delivered a laudatory speech about Europe and its legacy at the Munich Security Conference. He noted, however, that Europe is weakening. “We don’t want our allies to be weak,” he said.
His remarks initially were well received by the European political leaders and journalists in the room; not for long. Several journalists soon mentioned that, while Rubio appeared friendlier toward Europe than US Vice President J.D. Vance’s had been a year earlier, he was still “arrogant” in presuming that Europe needed advice on how to be stronger.
Some recalled that the Trump administration’s November 2025 National Security Strategy had warned that Europe faces the “prospect of civilizational erasure” — a claim they described as an “insult” to Europe.
Political leaders were also quick to express their rejection of what Rubio had said. The European Union’s foreign affairs and security policy chief, Kaja Kallas, in her own speech in Munich, declared: “Contrary to what some may say… Europe is not facing civilizational erasure.”
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz made a point of emphasizing that “European values” were not those championed by the Trump administration.
These reactions unfortunately have not changed the terrifying fact that Europe’s erasure as a civilization is underway. Europe is on a path toward rapid, widespread decline — potentially irreversible. It is already extremely late in the day. Unless drastic actions are taken to reverse firmly entrenched trends, European civilization, simply demographically, will soon be part of the past.
Economically, Europe is in ghastly shape. In 1980, the nine member states of the European Economic Community (today’s 27-member European Union) accounted for approximately 27% of global GDP, according to the IMF. By the end of 2025, the figure for the same nine countries (plus the former East Germany) had fallen significantly to just 15.5% of global GDP. Some European economists explain this disparity by citing the rapid development of China and the East Asian nations. A look at the US economy, however, shatters that explanation: in 1980, the United States accounted for 25.3% of global GDP — less than the EU’s share. By the end of 2025, the United States accounts for approximately 26% of global GDP — slightly more than in 1980.
For nearly five decades, the European Union’s economic growth and productivity rates have lagged behind those of the United States. Statistics also show that the total general government tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has increased in almost all member countries of the European Union — a trend not seen in the United States. Today, general government tax revenue accounts, on average, for more than 40% of the European Union’s total GDP. The figure for some countries is lower (22.4% for Ireland), but higher for several others: Denmark (45.8%), France (45.3%), Belgium (45.1%), and Italy (42.6%). The total general government tax revenue (federal, state, and local taxes plus social security) in the United States in 1980 was 25.6% of GDP. Today, it is still 25.6%. On average, populations in European Union countries pay far higher total taxes than Americans do, despite significant US investment in defense. The gap between the European Union and the United States has become immense.
European Union countries have established welfare states that have steadily expanded since 1980 and stifle economic growth. Today, social spending accounts for nearly 40% of total government budgets across the European Union — a figure far higher than that of the United States. Social insurance mandatory contributions in Europe are 2 to 2.5 times higher than in the United States for the same gross salary. This burden significantly increases labor costs for European companies and explains why employee take-home pay is lower in Europe than in the US. On average, in Europe, paying a monthly salary of €2,000 ($2,300) costs a company €3,800 ($4,375). In the US, paying a monthly salary of $2,000 costs a company only $2,200 to $2,800, depending on the state where it operates. The difference is considerable, and helps explain why unemployment in Europe is higher than in the United States.
The European Union has also proliferated stifling regulations that place a heavy encumbrance on businesses. Restrictions on gas and electricity production, combined with a drive for a rapid and extremely costly transition to “renewable energy”, have resulted in natural gas prices in Europe that are now three to five times higher than in the US, and electricity prices that are 2 to 4 times higher than in the US. To survive, many European companies have relocated production outside Europe.
International investment is turning away from Europe. Nine of the world’s top ten tech companies are American; the tenth is Taiwanese. There are no major European players in this crucial sector, and Europe is almost entirely absent from the field of artificial intelligence.
Although heatwaves have been affecting Europe for more than two decades, the continent remains resistant to air conditioning, viewing it as an expensive luxury (AC consumes costly electricity). On average, only 20% of households in EU countries have air conditioning. In 2003, a heatwave in Europe killed more than 20,000 people. Almost nothing was done to prevent a recurrence, so in 2026, another heatwave has already claimed 25,000 lives.
Other factors are also contributing to Europe’s decline.
Pessimism about the future — fueled by the questionable narrative berating “man-made global warming” and the hyped-up fear that the planet may become uninhabitable — is on the rise in Europe. Polls show that 63% of Europeans now believe their best years are behind them, and 77% believe that life in their country will be harder for the next generation. This pessimism is accompanied by a sharp drop in birth rates, with figures indicating that the population is rapidly aging. The average birthrate in the European Union now stands at 1.34 live births per woman, well below the generational replacement level of 2.1. This reflects an accelerating aging process that places an increasingly heavy obligation on pension and healthcare systems. In Spain, the figure is 1.10 live births per woman; in Italy, it is 1.14, and in Poland, it is also 1.10. Without major changes, Spain, Italy, and Poland will experience rapid population decline. Figures show that there were 3.46 million births and 4.81 million deaths in the European Union in 2025.
A trend toward downplaying traditional family roles is gaining ground in Europe, further exacerbating the problem of demographic replacement. In several European countries — Spain, Sweden, France, and the UK — sex education goes hand in hand with school textbooks explaining “gender identity,” “the possibility of sex reassignment” and “diverse family structures,” including having two mothers or two fathers. Across Europe, the number of same-sex and single-parent families is rising, and statistics show that such families generally have fewer children than families with both a father and a mother.
Europe’s population is decreasing, but mass migration, at this stage anyway, might be more of a burden on Europe’s finances than a contribution to its workforce or economic growth. Bureaucratic reports rosily predict “long term” gains. Even if mass migration were an economic benefit, it nevertheless is leading the European continent to cultural death.
Most new immigrants in Europe come from the Muslim world and appear to have no interest whatever in assimilating or becoming more westernized. Many are emphatically discouraged from doing either by the leaders of their communities, for instance, by “honor killings.” In addition, Muslim women have more children than non-Muslim women. In the UK, Muslim men may have up to four wives if married abroad, each of whom receives extra social welfare benefits. Muslims are doctrinally directed to despise Europe’s tolerance of the gay way of life; reject what is taught to their children regarding both history and sex education; see Europe as decadent and contemptible, and to openly reject the new societies in which they chose to live. There appears to be a growing demand among immigrants, in fact, to make Europe more like the Third World countries they abandoned.
The proportion of Muslims in the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden has been increasing decade after decade – with consequences that anyone even slightly versed in history could have expected. Warnings have gone unheeded.
Most Muslims arriving in Europe come from countries where antisemitism and hatred of Israel are widespread. Once settled in Europe, they remain antisemitic and hateful toward Israel, and contribute aggressively to the sharp rise of Jew-hate and anti-Israel bias in the countries where they now live. Many native Europeans ally themselves politically with them, declare themselves “anti-Zionist” (hostile to the existence of Israel), and show immense tolerance for Muslim antisemitism.
In the UK, the Equality and Human Rights Commission established in an October 29, 2020 report that the Labour Party was guilty of “inappropriate political interference” by Jeremy Corbyn’s office in several antisemitism cases. Corbyn was suspended from party membership and, in 2024, expelled from the party. He created a separate party with another former Labour member, Zarah Sultana, an “anti-Zionist” Muslim. Both were reelected in 2024 and are still MPs.
In France, the main left-wing party, La France Insoumise (France Unbowed) is “anti-Zionist,” openly supports Palestinian organizations, and refuses to define Hamas as a terrorist organization. Some of its leaders who have made antisemitic remarks have been prosecuted but not convicted.
Starting immediately with the terrorist group Hamas’s invasion of Israel and massacre of October 7, 2023, and throughout Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza, anti-Israel demonstrations chanting slogans in support of Hamas were on the march in all major Western European cities. Appallingly, since the massacre, antisemitic attacks have seen a sharp increase across Western Europe, while Jews continue to leave Europe.
A poll conducted for the European Jewish Congress (EJC) shows that a majority of Jews still in Europe would like to leave. Ariel Muzicant, the president of EJC said in 2024, “We’re losing the battle. 57% of European Jews are considering leaving. In a few years, 50% of the communities may no longer exist.”
Political parties defending Western civilization and values — while asserting their opposition to the Islamization of Europe and “civilizational erasure” — are gaining electoral momentum. Meanwhile, political leaders across major European nations and at the helm of the EU appear determined to prevent those parties from governing (such as here, here and here).
In Germany, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) leads in polls of voter intentions but faces a boycott by other parties known as the Brandmauer (“firewall”), with all other national and state parties forming alliances that exclude the AfD to prevent it from forming or even participating in governments.
In the United Kingdom — no longer part of the EU — Reform UK won many recent local elections and might be positioned to eclipse the Conservative Party. Meanwhile, a national poll conducted on July 26-27, 2026, revealed that the Labour Party had reached a record low among potential voters: 22%, the worst results for a British governing party since the 1940s. With no general election due until 2029, Keir Starmer resigned as prime minister, and his successor, Andy Burnham, was appointed by the Labour Party, apparently trying to avoid a new general election as long as it can.
In France, the National Rally (NR) has been the country’s most popular party for years. During the 2024 legislative elections, the NR appeared poised to win an absolute majority. Just before the election’s second round, President Emmanuel Macron urged all other parties to form a “Republican Front.” Their leaders called for votes to go to whichever candidate stood the best chance of defeating the NR contender: leading moderate right-wing voters to vote for far-left candidates, and left-wing and far-left voters to vote for moderate right-wing parties. The result was a fragmented National Assembly, unable to form a government cohesive enough to make policy decisions.
France’s economic situation was already concerning; it has since worsened. Unemployment is at 8% and is rising. Bankruptcies among small and medium-sized enterprises are increasing (in 2025, 69,957 businesses went bankrupt). National Rally’s Marine Le Pen has been leading the polls for the 2027 presidential election. She had been sentenced to three years in prison and 45 months (with 30 months suspended) of a public office ban, for actions that had previously led to dropped charges for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of France Unbowed. The alleged crime was that Le Pen and Mélenchon allowed parliamentary assistants to Members of the European Parliament to work in Paris for the MEPs they served. Le Pen appealed the case to the Court of Cassation, France’s supreme court of appeal, which suspended the sentence.
Le Pen’s conviction has not diminished her popularity. The Court of Cassation has stated it will issue its ruling before the 2027 presidential election, and the court’s president has hinted that the conviction will be upheld — meaning that if elected, Le Pen would become the first French president to win office while under a prison sentence. Mathilde Panot, president of the France Unbowed group in the National Assembly, declared that her party would not recognize the legitimacy of Le Pen’s election should she win, and would call for an uprising.
The “offense” of those political parties disfavored by Europe’s “elites” consists of defending the values of the West, fighting the Islamization of Europe, and opposing the erasure of European civilization. These political parties are consequently subjected to exclusionary maneuvers and are relentlessly harassed by rival political leaders who not only seem to disagree but are also dragging the continent into a free fall and a possible cultural death.
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Why Is Israel Taking Gaza Kites Seriously?Recently, several kites have flown into Israeli territory from Gaza. Here’s why Israelis are so concerned.By Chaim Lax 24August2026 https://honestreporting.com/why-is-israel-taking-gaza-kites-seriously/  Hamas Kites
Key Takeaways:
These were some of the incredulous responses on social media after Israel’s defense minister instructed the IDF to “act forcefully” against those sending kites from Gaza into Israel, following reports that several had been discovered in Israeli communities bordering the Gaza Strip.
To those unfamiliar with the history of Hamas, Israel, and Gaza, the reaction might seem excessive. Why would one of the region’s most powerful militaries be concerned about a handful of kites drifting across the border? But the history of weaponized kites from Gaza explains why Israel is not simply dismissing the latest incidents as child’s play.
Kids flying kites in Gaza had those kites land on Israeli territory Not only is this newsworthy, byt residents called the IDF and asked them to respond! And what did the IDF do? Well the Defence Minister ordered the military to respond “immediately and forcefully” to any further launches, describing each incident as an “act of war.” I am not making this up! His exact words: “A balloon is treated like a kite, and a kite is treated like a drone, with or without explosives. Anyone organizing, carrying out, or facilitating the launches will be dealt with immediately and with full severity.” Please help me understand how this is real, because I’m honestly lost for words HonestReporting-tweet-24August2026-why Israel takes incendiary balloons and kites from Gaza so seriously In 2018, Palestinian terrorists launched waves of balloons and kites carrying incendiary and explosive devices into Israel, setting thousands of acres ablaze, destroying crops and wildlife, and threatening nearby communities. Israeli children were even warned not to touch balloons or kites they found in case they were booby-trapped. This wasn’t harmless “protest.” It was a deliberate weaponization of everyday objects against Israeli civilians. Israel has every reason to ensure it never happens again.  Mario Nawfal-tweet-23August2026-Hamas incendiary balloons and kites from Gaza harmless  HonestReporting-tweet-24August2026-why Israel takes incendiary balloons and kites from Gaza so seriously
When Kites Became WeaponsIn 2018, Israel faced weekly mass Palestinian riots and protests along the Gaza border fence. Within weeks, kites fitted with incendiary materials began to be launched across the border into Israel.
Palestinian terrorists soon added incendiary balloons, which could travel farther into Israeli territory. What looked like children’s playthings became delivery systems for fire and, later, improvised explosives, Molotov cocktails, and grenades.
As the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center noted at the time, Hamas did not formally claim responsibility for the low-tech attacks, but there were clear links between the terrorist organization and those launching the kites and balloons.
By the summer of 2018, the attacks had become relentless. Between July and September, incendiary kites and balloons were reported to have caused an average of 12 fires per day inside Israel.
Over just a few months, those fires scorched thousands of acres of Israeli agricultural land and nature reserves, killing wildlife, destroying farmland, and damaging natural ecosystems. The cost ran into millions of shekels, with some estimates suggesting that parts of southern Israel’s environment could take a decade to fully recover.
The use of incendiary kites and balloons by Palestinian terrorists peaked in 2018 and 2019, but it did not end there. In 2021, Hamas broke a recently established ceasefire with Israel by launching incendiary balloons into the Jewish state.
 Isaac Choua-tweet-23August2026-Palestinian (incendiary) Kites in 2018
Why the Latest Kites Have Raised AlarmThat history provides the context for Israel’s concern over the latest kites. It is possible that several Gazan children simply lost control of them and that they happened to drift into Israeli communities. But Israeli officials reportedly see reasons to consider another possibility.
According to reports, the IDF believes that the kites, which did not carry incendiary materials, may have been deliberately directed across the border by Hamas to test Israel’s response to objects launched from Gaza.
There were also reports that some of the kites were attached to strings between two and four kilometers long and carried messages in Arabic, making the explanation that they were simply children’s playthings less convincing.
The unusually long strings have reportedly fueled suspicions that the flights could be connected to intelligence gathering or serve as a dry run for fiber-optic drones, a technology Hezbollah has used against Israeli troops in southern Lebanon.
The IDF confirmed this evening that four kites launched from Gaza have landed in Israeli communities along the border, including those hit hardest by the October 7 massacre. The kites are believed to have crossed from Gaza and were connected to wires stretching several kilometers. No suspicious findings were detected on them, and the IDF says there was no danger to the public. But the development is concerning not just for the Israelis who could be the potential victims of these kites if they turn into weapons. The use of kites as a potential delivery platform is reminiscent of the improvised optical fibres explosive drones Hezbollah has used against Israeli forces in Lebanon. If Hamas is experimenting with a new type of weapon that can cross the border and potentially deliver explosives, instead of disarming as it vowed to the Board of Peace the meaning could be extremely hazardous for the people of Gaza just as much and for any foreign states that plan to invest in the new Gaza Strip.  Guy Azriel Diplomatic Correspondent-tweet-22August2026-Kites from Gaza
Hamas Is Already RebuildingThe timing has added to those concerns.
In May 2026, Israeli media reported that the IDF was increasingly concerned about Hamas rearming and rebuilding its terrorist infrastructure, as well as the possibility that the group could seek to reignite fighting with Israel.
Three months later, the sudden appearance of kites over Israeli border communities inevitably raises the question of whether Hamas is once again probing Israel’s defenses: first with harmless objects, potentially followed by incendiary devices or more sophisticated weapons.
One of the central lessons Israel drew from October 7 was the danger of dismissing Hamas’ activities as insignificant simply because they do not appear immediately threatening. Tactics that seem crude, performative, or even absurd can still be used to gather intelligence, test Israeli responses, or prepare the ground for something more dangerous.
So however ridiculous Israel’s concern over a few kites may appear from afar, it does not exist in a vacuum. Israelis living near Gaza remember years in which kites and balloons set their fields and nature reserves ablaze. And after October 7, Israel has even less reason to assume that apparently harmless activity along the Gaza border is necessarily what it seems.
Liked this article? Follow HonestReporting on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and TikTok to see even more posts and videos debunking news bias and smears, as well as other content explaining what’s really going on in Israel and the region. Get updates direct to your phone. Join our WhatsApp and Telegram channels!
© Divuach Ne’eman, 2025
Chaim LaxOriginally from Toronto, Canada, Chaim moved to Israel in 2018. He has a B.A. (Hons) in Political Science and History from York University as well as an MA in Israel Studies from the Rothberg International School at Hebrew University. Prior to joining HonestReporting, Chaim worked with a variety of Israel advocacy organizations in both Canada and Israel.
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Throwing Stones
 Cat-tweet-21October2025-Adele Biton age 4 killed by thrown stone
 Adele Biton age 4 killed by thrown stone BACKGROUND: Remember all those killed by “Just throwing rocks”UPDATE:Palestinian terrorists threw stones at the IDF, IDF returns fire
The soldiers did not hesitate and responded by opening fire. Do you support a hard line against terrorism?  Isaac-tweet-25August2026-stone throwing at IDF-IDF return fire
Israel Police released stone throwing video
Israel Police released previously omitted seconds from footage showing the Palestinian man who was later shot by Israeli forces in Qalandiya throwing stones at security forces during the evacuation of the UNRWA compound, moments before the shooting. The footage adds important context to the incident and challenges the narrative presented in the original clip. @selenaryan_  Mossad Commentary-tweet-27August2026-Israel Police released stone throwing video
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Map of 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel Map of 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel
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HAMAS REFUSES TO DISARM
Hamas representative in Iran Khaled Qaddoumi rejects disarmament, saying the group’s weapons will remain as long as what he calls the Israeli “occupation” continues. Qaddoumi has repeatedly rejected calls for Hamas to surrender its weapons, arguing that disarmament is not an option while Israel remains in what Hamas describes as “occupation.” The position highlights one of the biggest obstacles to any long-term Gaza settlement: Israel demands Hamas fully disarm, while Hamas continues to defend retaining its weapons for “resistance.”  Mossad Commentary-tweet-25August2026-HAMAS REFUSES TO DISARM
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Palestinian Textbooks continue to glorify terror and promote violence
Students learn addition and subtraction by counting “martyrs.” Newton’s law of gravity is illustrated with a slingshot aimed at Israeli soldiers. A fifth-grade reading lesson features Dalal Mughrabi, who participated in the 1978 Coastal Road massacre that killed 38 Israeli civilians including 13 children – presented as a hero. An eighth-grade grammar lesson glorifies suicide bombers who wore explosive belts. The same textbooks – produced by the Palestinian Authority’s Education Ministry in Ramallah with European Union funding – are used in PA schools, UNRWA schools, and Hamas schools alike. “These books clearly helped create the environment that led to October 7,” said IMPACT-se researcher Arik Agasi. “Our warnings were not heeded.” Despite repeated international demands to end incitement in school textbooks, the Palestinian Authority continues to embed terror glorification and antisemitic content. This is a profound betrayal of its own future generations. This deliberate perpetuation of hatred and violence cannot be ignored. PA leaders must be held accountable for choosing indoctrination over peace and standing in the way of any hope for a better, more peaceful future.  StandWithUs-tweet-3September2026-PA-textbooks-glorify terror-promote violence
 PA-textbooks-glorify terror-promote violence
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“Settler Violence” Palestinian libel
No one doubts where your heart is. Your support for Israel is unwavering and historic. There is violence in Judea and Samaria — there has been for many years. But Jews don’t wake up in the morning saying “I’m going to go kill a Palestinian today.” The opposite, of course, is not true — hundreds and hundreds of Jewish residents of J&S have been murdered by Palestinian terrorists. Most Palestinian residents of J&S cheered 9/11, 10/7, support Hamas and want to push the Jews out of all of Israel, not just J&S. So of course there is violence between Jews and Arabs in Judea and Samaria. But the two questions are 1) why does it exist, and 2) how is it being used by Israel’s enemies? It exists for the reasons described above — Jews need to defend themselves. Some acts of defense are debatable, some may be inappropriate. But they are acts of defense nonetheless against ruthless thugs that simply refuse to live in peace on any terms with their Jewish neighbors. The “settler violence” libel is being used, as you recognize, as part of a coordinated PR effort by the same people who falsely accuse Israel of genocide. The Palestinian-Americans who had no difficulty building beautiful houses in the area are now draping American flags on their houses so that attacks against them — which they instigate — can be filmed as attacks against America. It’s all a cynical campaign and its roots go back more than a century. Of course I agree that settler violence hurts Israel’s “standing” in the world, but it hurts less than giving Palestinian terrorists free rein to kill more Jews. Unfortunately, labeling the Jews who fight back as “terrorists” is a win for the anti-Israel PR machine who then create a moral equivalency between both sides. Your correct observation that the Jews committing acts of violence are a tiny fraction of the total Jewish population is a distinction entirely lost on the media, who have a false narrative to uphold.  David M Friedman-tweet-6September2026-Settler Violence-Palestinian libel
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The Jews in Their Land: The Archeological EvidenceBy Hugh Fitzgerald – on 6September2026 https://gellerreport.com/2026/09/the-jews-in-their-land-the-archeological-evidence.html/
Antisemites are in a permanent state of denial. They deny that there was ever a Holocaust. They deny that Jews have been oppressed through time and space. And now, those who hate the very idea of a Jewish state deny that Jews ever lived in the Land of Israel. But the archeological evidence tells a different story: it is full of mentions of ancient Israel, not only by Jews, but also by Egyptian pharaohs. More on the silent witnesses of the Jews’ connection to their land can be found here.
The cancellation of that exhibition was a shameful episode in self-censorship by the administrators at the British Museum, afraid of offending Muslim Arabs. Possibly it was thought that they would be angered enough to end any financial contribution to the museum, but as a visit to the the British Museum and a reading of its records make clear, by far the greatest contributors to the Museum have been Jews. Among them is the Sir Percival David collection of 10,000 Chinese ceramics, worth more than $1 billion, the Waddesdon Bequest that was bequeathed in 1898 by Baron Ferdinand de Rothschild, an unparalleled collection of nearly 300 Renaissance and medieval pieces, including exquisite jewelry, gold plate, enamels, and micro-carvings; the Hull Grundy gift donated in 1978 by the German-born Jewish philanthropist and art historian Anne Hull Grundy, this gift comprised over 1,200 pieces of 17th- to 20th-century European jewelry.
In the Land of Israel today, there are more than 20,000 archeological sites that tell the story, for the past 3,500 years, of the Jews in their land. Palestinian Arabs have been known to destroy artifacts at these sites, or to steal artifacts from them, ripping them from their historical context, in order to sell them abroad. But there is just too much of this evidence — ceramics, tools, the in weapons, eating utensils, drinking vessels — to overlook, and too many foreign, non-Jewish archeologists who have seen these sites, helped in some cases to discover them, unearth them, and study them, to deny their existence.
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New town founded in response to sanctionsAs Britain backs boycotts targeting Israeli communities, the first buildings of Metzukei Eretz are being installed in eastern Binyamin ahead of the first families’ arrival.Arutz Sheva / Published: 9September2026, 12:50 PM (GMT+3) / https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/432942
Facing British Sanctions: The First Structures Have Been Placed in the New Settlement
The first buildings of the new town of Metzukei Eretz are being transported and installed along the Alon Highway in eastern Binyamin, as preparations continue for the arrival of the first families in the coming weeks.
The construction comes against the backdrop of Britain’s decision to promote boycotts and sanctions against Israeli towns in Judea and Samaria, with additional countries reportedly joining the effort. Despite the measures being advanced by foreign governments, preparations for the establishment of the new town are continuing.
This is the first time in decades that a new town has been established along the Alon Highway, which was planned and approved in advance as an official, organized community. The buildings currently being installed will house the families forming the town’s initial core. At the same time, work is being accelerated to connect the town to water and electricity networks and to prepare access roads. Construction has also begun on the site’s first public building.
Binyamin Regional Council head and Yesha Council chairman Yisrael Gantz welcomed the development in response to the measures being promoted by Britain.
“Our response to sanctions and boycotts is here, on the ground. While Britain is trying to punish Jews for living and building in Judea and Samaria, we are putting up the first structures of a new town in our ancestral land,” Yisrael Gantz said. “The British Mandate ended long ago, and boycotts from London will not determine the future of Judea and Samaria. They will try to impose boycotts, and we will continue to build. More families, more homes, more towns, and Israeli sovereignty,” he added.
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