

THE WRITING ON THE WALL (of Jericho)

**Conceptual Collapse:
The Palestinian Authority Security
Apparatus as a Partner for Peace**



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Regavim (R.A) is a public movement dedicated to the protection of Israel's national lands and resources.

The Regavim Movement acts to prevent illegal seizure of state land, and to protect the rule of law and clean government in matters pertaining to land-use policy in the State of Israel.

The Regavim Movement is active in the public, parliamentary and judicial spheres, through publication of opinion and research papers, and through the dissemination of reports, policy and opinion papers, media communications and, when necessary, legal action.

Regavim's activities are directed toward accomplishing one mission: Restoring the Zionist vision to its primary role in the Israeli policy process.

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CAPABILITIES

PASF Special Forces



101
Specializing in urban warfare, breaching structures, tactical parachuting



S.A.T
Specializing in rapid incursion on sport motorcycles and in-motion shooting



BAT Force
specializing in night-vision assisted combat in complete darkness and low-signature ops

Training - local and foreign locations



Command and Control



Conventional Warfare



Artillery and Armored Corps Training



Commando Training



Tactical Diving



Tactical Parachuting

RESOURCES

TROOPS



30,000
Oslo Accords



65,000
CURRENT

WEAPONS



Light weapons only
(plus small number of machine guns and armored vehicles)

Oslo Accords



RPGs, PKM heavy machine guns (armored vehicle-piercing), sniper weapons, armored vehicles, military grade explosives and explosive devices

CURRENT

INTENT

"To the independence of the Palestinian Nation"

Yaser Arafat, quoted by the Military Training Division

"This nation will protect Arabism and the holy places, from the Ocean to the Gulf"


"The cursed Balfour Declaration, a promise given by those who do not own to those who are not worthy" from a lecture to military cadets

"The moment, O Sea, the moment of our absence has been too long"

"Occupied Haifa"

from "Blessed Friday" videos

TIMELINE OF DECEIT





Executive Summary

The story of the Palestinian Authority's security apparatus is the story of one of the most complex and dangerous security concepts in the history of the State of Israel. What began in the early 1990s, with the signing of the Oslo Accords, as a promise to establish a civilian policing force intended to maintain public order and combat terrorism "without the High Court of Justice and without B'Tselem,"¹ developed over three decades into a two-faced entity.

On the one hand, the PA's security forces operate as a system that maintains security coordination with Israel and enjoys broad international legitimacy and funding; on the other hand, they form a mechanism whose roots are deeply embedded in terrorism that trains and prepares its officers to overtake and occupy communities while glorifying messages of "return" to cities such as Haifa, Be'er Sheva, and Jaffa.

Over the years, the leadership of the Palestinian Authority developed a strategy to present itself outwardly as a functioning administrative apparatus while managing a terrorist organization from within, functioning both as an official governmental entity and as a generator and supporter of terrorism in Judea and Samaria and throughout Israel. Foundational events such as the Western Wall Tunnel riots in 1996 and the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000 revealed that the weapons given to the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (henceforth, PASF) for policing purposes quickly became tools of organized murder, directed and supported by the highest levels of the Palestinian Authority leadership. Even after Operation Defensive Shield, during which Israel destroyed the infrastructure of terrorist activity in Palestinian Authority-controlled

¹ Yitzchak Rabin's famous description of how the Palestinian Authority would be better positioned to combat terrorism by any and all means, unfettered by the legal and public opinion constraints under which Israel operates.

cities, the patently false paradigm continued to hold sway under a new cover of "rehabilitation" and "professionalization" under the auspices of the "Dayton Model"² and modern security coordination.

Currently, in the shadow of the events of October 7th 2023, it is becoming clear that the Palestinian security apparatus has undergone a deep process of militarization and strategic reorientation over the past several decades. In complete contradiction to the limitations stipulated in the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority has established a semi-regular army numbering tens of thousands of armed personnel, including elite offensive units equipped with heavy military weaponry. On the ground, in reality, members of the PASF - ostensibly serving as police officers - are deeply involved in the glorification of terrorism and even in terrorist activity itself, as will be detailed below.

This report seeks to present a review of the transformation of the Palestinian security apparatus, from its establishment to the present day, to analyze the build-up of military force taking place locally and globally, and to expose the intolerable gap between the facade of cooperation and the strategic threat that is taking shape in the heart of Judea and Samaria. The purpose of this report is to illuminate the collapse of the security concept in Judea and Samaria and to warn against a large-scale "blowback scenario" in which Israeli-supplied weapons are turned against Israel, which could place the State of Israel in direct danger for the next October 7th-style massacre.

Special thanks and appreciation to Guy Grossman and the OSINT team at "Behind the Scenes." Their professional contribution, reflected in an in-depth investigation of the development of the apparatuses, constituted a significant knowledge base for the writing of this report.

² The revamped model for the PASF formulated by US General Keith Dayton as a means of building a security apparatus disconnected from political and nationalist context.

Chapter I – The Establishment of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces

In August 1993, Israel and representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, an internationally-sanctioned terrorist group, signed the first stage of the Oslo Accords, which included the establishment of an autonomous authority in parts of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian Authority (PA) was granted internal governance powers along with the right to establish a limited police force responsible for law enforcement, maintaining public order, dispute resolution, and criminal investigations in areas under its jurisdiction.

The following year, the Cairo Agreement further detailed the provisions set out in the first stage of the Oslo Accords.³ Israel agreed to withdraw from Gaza and Jericho, transferring civil authority to the Palestinian Authority. The PA was granted legislative, executive, judicial, and policing powers, exercised through several bodies: the Palestinian Police, Public Security, Military Intelligence, and the Presidential Guard. The agreement limited these forces to 9,000 personnel and capped their weapons at 7,000 light arms, 120 medium machine guns, and a maximum of 45 light armored vehicles.

As autonomy was expanded to additional Arab cities in Judea and Samaria following the Oslo II Agreement, these quotas expanded significantly in order to accommodate the size of the population under PA jurisdiction,⁴ reaching 12,000 personnel in Judea and Samaria, equipped with up to 4,000

pistols, up to 120 machine guns of 0.3" or 0.5" caliber and no more than 15 light, unarmed riot vehicles. The structure of the Palestinian Authority's security apparatus evolved into its current form, comprised of nine primary organizations tasked exclusively with internal security, including:⁵

- **General Intelligence** – (parallel to Israel's Mossad) tasked with maintaining internal stability and intelligence gathering both within and beyond PA jurisdictional areas, prevention of spying and terrorism. This branch is supported by the CIA and Britain's MI6 intelligence services.
- **Preventive Security** – (parallel to Israel's General Security Service, "ShaBaK") Official responsibilities include preserving PA stability and counterterrorism and combatting elements affiliated with Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Judea and Samaria
- **National Security Forces** – (parallel to the IDF) trained in the PA's military academy in Jericho by professional European instructors, as well as training in training facilities in Jordan under US supervision. This branch is, for all intents and purposes, the PA's army, the largest of the PASF forces, tasked with protecting the Arab cities under PA jurisdiction, carrying out arrests and maintaining law and order.
- **Palestinian Civil ("Blue") Police** – In addition to maintaining public order and crimefighting, tasked with controlling protests and preventing confrontation with IDF forces.
- **Presidential Guard** – (parallel to the Knesset Guard and VIP protection detail, This is the 'evolved' version and successor to Fatah's 'Force 17' that was responsible for Yaser Arafat's personal protection. The Presidential Guard also provides security for foreign VIPs.
- **Military Intelligence** – (parallel to Israel's DSDE – "MaLMaB" – and Military Police) – among other tasks, responsible for internal enforcement within the PASF for criminal or terrorist offenses.
- **Coordination and Liaison Mechanism** – responsible for security coordination with Israel – This mechanism was created under the Oslo II Accord (Appendix 1,3) regarding mutual coordination and cooperation. This is the mechanism through which Israelis who accidentally enter

³ See the full text of the Cairo Agreement here: <https://bit.ly/3PzyuvG>

⁴ See Oslo II Agreement, Annex 1 Article 3 (Deployment): <https://bit.ly/3NygckQ>

⁵ Moran Tal and Yonah Admoni, "Officers by Day, Terrorists by Night: PASF Involvement in Terrorism," Regavim 2024. <https://bit.ly/4IPbuoM>

PA-controlled areas are handed over to the IDF, through which “price tag” attacks are reported to Israeli authorities, through which the IDF notifies the PA to recall forces from areas in which the IDF plans arrest operations or other activity in Area A, and other communications.

Over time, the Palestinian Authority systematically exceeded the personnel and ammunitions limits set out in the Oslo II Agreement. By 1998, in the context of the Wye River Agreement⁶ and Israel’s objections to the PA’s violations – estimates of the force at that time were 35,000 active officers for a force nearly double the size agreed upon in Oslo II – the role and size of the ASF were restated and clarified once again, and the staffing cap was revised to 30,000 ASF officers. Israel demanded a precise list of all members of the PA security apparatus in order to cross-check for terrorist activity and affiliations.⁷

In practice, with time the PASF ballooned far beyond their intended scope, both in terms of size and in terms of structure and the types of training of its personnel. The Palestinian Police transformed from a police force into a de facto army of professionally-trained infantry soldiers. Each of the branches of the Palestinian security apparatus were given expanded authority, and within each of the branches subsidiaries were established, empowered and tasked with a variety of security tasks.

⁶ Wye River Agreement, Paragraph 2: <https://bit.ly/41kyAdf>
⁷ Ibid., 2.1.

Chapter II – From Security Coordination to Covert Terror

Arafat’s Revolving Door

A central flaw in the Oslo framework’s security arrangements was the assumption on the part of the Israeli signatories that the Palestinian Authority sought stability.⁸ In reality, Yasser Arafat employed a dual strategy—presenting himself as a statesman while maintaining terrorist activity. In numerous conferences, such as his speech at the Johannesburg conference in 1994, Arafat compared the Oslo Accords to the “Hudaybiyyah Agreement”—an Islamic term describing a temporary, deceptive truce, concluded in bad faith from a position of weakness vis-à-vis the enemy and violated once Islamic military strength is restored. In other words, from Arafat’s perspective, Oslo was not a final objective, but rather a tactic for the future takeover of the entire territory.⁹

This was reflected in the “revolving door” policy: To relieve international pressure after terrorist attacks against Israelis, the PA “arrested” terrorists, making sure to publicize the arrests before releasing the perpetrators quickly, quietly and without prosecution as soon as media interest faded. No attempt was made to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorist activity.¹⁰

⁸ Itai Baron, “From Aerial Superiority to a Multi-Dimensional Blow: The use of aerial strength and its role in Israel’s military strategy,” (Hebrew) pp. 129-139. Institute for National Security Studies, 2022. <https://bit.ly/3NGGQB3>

⁹ Professor Ehraim Karsh, “The Oslo War: Anatomy of Self Delusion,” (Hebrew) Begin Saadat Center, Bar Ilan University.

¹⁰ Colonel (res.) Prof. Gabi Siboni and Brigadier General (res.) Prof. Erez Winner, “The Palestinian Authority: Asset or Liability?” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, 2025. <https://bit.ly/3PmBXOd>



Figure 1: PASF troops participate in riots. Credit: Flash 90

The Western Wall Tunnel Riots

As contact towards negotiations between Israel and the PLO became more serious, and particularly following the signing of the Oslo Agreement, Israel became more invested in the concept of the PASF and Yaser Arafat's PLO as effective partners in the battle against terrorism and the effort to stamp it out – even more effectively, in fact, than Israel was capable of doing on its own. This mindset was expressed by the late Yitzhak Rabin, then Prime Minister of Israel: “The Palestinian Police will fight Hamas without Betsalem, without the High Court of Justice and without ‘Mothers Against Silence.’”¹¹

The deepest breach of trust came in September 1996, with the opening of an exit to the Kotel tunnel. What began as riots fueled by the false claim that Israel was harming Islamic holy sites, escalated with Arafat's encouragement¹² into direct armed clashes between IDF forces and Palestinian security personnel.

For five days, the “weapons of Oslo” – weapons given to the PASF by the State of Israel - were turned against Israel for the first time. Seventeen Israeli soldiers were killed, exposing the PASF as a dual-purpose force—partners in coordination when convenient, and armed adversaries when directed by the PA leadership to turn to armed combat with Israel .

11 From an interview on Channel 1, March 1, 1994.

12 Dr. Avner Barnea, “Israeli Intelligence, the Second Intifada, and Strategic Surprise: A Case of ‘Intelligence to Please’?” The Israel Journal of Society, Military and National Security. Association of Civil and Military Studies in Israel, March 2022.

Chapter III – Collapse of the Concept and the Second Intifada

Coordinated Combat Operations

With the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000, the facade of security coordination collapsed. Under Arafat's directive, the PASF ceased to function as a restraining force and became the spearhead of the armed struggle. The Palestinian Authority not only failed to curb the violence, but established the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades” on the basis of officers and salaried personnel from the official security apparatuses.

At the outset of the confrontation, the PASF adopted a tactic of “fighting hand in hand.” At the field level, commanders in the General Intelligence and National Security branches directly commanded terrorist cells. One prominent example is Nasser Awis,¹³ who served as an officer in the General Intelligence apparatus in Nablus and simultaneously as one of the founders of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Awis and his operatives used the professional knowledge they had acquired through coordination with Israel in order to plan incursions and deadly attacks.

One of the most moments seared into collective memory of the Intifada was the lynching in Ramallah, in which two IDF reservists were murdered inside the Palestinian police station in al-Bireh by members of the PASF and with their assistance. The police officers—who, instead of protecting the soldiers who had mistakenly entered the area, collaborated with the

13 Tzvi Harel, “Barghouti's deputy convicted of 14 counts of murder,” Haaretz 1 May 2003. <https://bit.ly/4INUcZ1>



Figure 2: The *Karine A* and the weapons on board

enraged mob—enabled their brutal murder. The incident ended only after the mutilated bodies were thrown to IDF forces, and it became one of the defining symbols of the complete breakdown of trust in the Palestinian security forces.

Another example of direct involvement of PASF personnel in terrorism is the attack at the “Armon David” events hall in Hadera (January 2002). The terrorist, Abd al-Salam Hassouna, a member of the PASF, entered the hall during a bat mitzvah celebration and unleashed a shooting spree that claimed the lives of six Israelis. These events illustrated the final collapse of the paradigm: the weapons given to the PASF for the purpose of “maintaining order” became the instruments of murder used in attacks against Israeli civilians.

From Palestinian Police to a Full-Fledged Army

The peak of institutional involvement was exposed in 2002 with the interception of the weapons ship *Karine A*.¹⁴ The ship, which was purchased by the Palestinian Authority and loaded in Iran in coordination

14 Betty Barshadski and Anan Sarkhan, “2002 – Operation ‘Noah’s Ark’ Capturing the Weapons Ship *Karine A*,” (Hebrew) IDF. Also see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Seizing of the Palestinian Weapons Ship, *Karine A*,” 4 January 2002 <https://www.gov.il/en/pages/seizing-of-the-palestinian-weapons-ship-karine-a-4-jan-2002> .

with Hezbollah, carried 50 tons of game-changing weaponry: Grad rockets with a range of 20 kilometers, advanced anti-tank missiles, and more than two tons of military-grade explosives—an amount intended to produce hundreds of suicide belts and powerful roadside mines.

The man behind the operation was Fuad Shubaki, a brigadier general and head of the financial apparatus of the PASF.¹⁵ Shubaki, one of Arafat’s closest associates, served a 17-year sentence in an Israeli prison. He functioned as the “logistics officer of terror” and managed procurement from Iran with the approval of the highest political echelon. His involvement demonstrated that the PASF had become a well-oiled system for laundering international aid funds for the purpose of acquiring strategic weaponry intended to alter the balance of power vis-à-vis the IDF. After his death, he received a lavish funeral attended by senior Palestinian Authority officials.

Removing the Masks

The weapons, training, and command structure established under the Oslo framework were systematically directed against the IDF and Israeli civilians. Members of the apparatuses in uniform—some of whom had undergone joint training with IDF officers—took up firing positions at friction points and used the Kalashnikov rifles they had received per the Oslo agreements to fire at soldiers and civilians. With the backing of the highest levels of Palestinian Authority leadership, the police force that was supposed to prevent terrorism became the manager of terrorism.

A clear example of institutional involvement is the activity of “Force 17”—the elite presidential unit.¹⁶ Its members exploited their official Palestinian Authority vehicles and “diplomatic” license plates to bypass checkpoints, transport suicide belts, and carry out ambushes and shooting attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers. After carrying out these attacks, they would flee to official Palestinian Authority headquarters in Area A, which became protected sanctuary cities beyond the reach of Israeli security forces.

15 Barshadski and Srkhan, p.2.

16 Tal and Admoni, “Officers by Day, Terrorists by Night,” p.22 <https://bit.ly/4IPbuoM> .

The numbers reveal the magnitude of the failure: while in all of the 1980s only dozens of Israelis were killed by terrorism, the Second Intifada claimed the lives of more than 1,100 victims.¹⁷ The Oslo Accords not only failed to bring security, but armed and entrenched an enemy operating from within territory under its own control. The promise of fighting terrorism “without the High Court and without B’Tselem” was replaced by a reality in which Israeli-supplied weapons were directed straight at the heart of Israeli civilians.

Operation Defensive Shield

In response to the Intifada and the high number of casualties, the State of Israel launched a large-scale military operation in March 2002 that lasted approximately six weeks—the largest operation since the First Lebanon War. During the operation, the IDF took control of all Arab towns and cities in Judea and Samaria, including those in Area A (with the exception of the Hebron area).

The objectives of the operation were articulated by then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as follows:¹⁸

“Clear instructions have been given to IDF soldiers and their commanders: to enter the cities and villages that have become sanctuaries for terrorists; to capture and arrest terrorists, and above all those who dispatch them, those who finance them, and those who shelter them; to seize and confiscate weapons and means of warfare intended to harm Israel; to expose and destroy terrorist infrastructure, explosives laboratories, weapons manufacturing facilities, and hiding places. The orders are clear: to strike anyone who takes up arms and to incapacitate anyone who attempts to resist our forces and endanger them, while avoiding harm to the civilian population.”

Over the course of the operation, the IDF fundamentally redefined the Palestinian security apparatus:¹⁹ they ceased to be regarded as a policing

body and became clear military targets. Official headquarters, which by day functioned as policing centers, became at night sniper positions and ammunition depots. The peak of the confrontation centered on the siege of the Muqata’a compound in Ramallah, where it was revealed that the governing complex had become a safe haven for senior wanted terrorists and operatives directly involved in the assassination of an Israeli minister and in suicide bombings.

The raids on Palestinian Authority headquarters yielded a “smoking gun”: Israeli forces uncovered official PA documents proving that the Palestinian Authority was not a victim of terrorism, but rather its financier and operator.²⁰ Requests for payment for explosives and funding for attacks were found bearing Arafat’s original signature. These findings exposed concerted, institutional, large-scale deception of the international community, in which European aid funds intended for civilian infrastructure were systematically diverted to the purchase of weapons and the payment of salaries to wanted terrorists.

The conclusion of the operation marked the physical and conceptual collapse of the Oslo paradigm. The IDF destroyed most of the PASF headquarters, confiscated thousands of weapons, and canceled the “immunity” of Area A. In doing so, full operational freedom was restored to the IDF in Judea and Samaria, while the Palestinian Authority was left without significant military power, after it was proven that the system meant to build a state had in practice served as the logistical arm of the Intifada.

17 Itai Baron, “From Aerial Superiority to Multi-dimensional Blow,” (Hebrew), p. 132. Institute for National Security Studies.

18 PM Ariel Sharon, remarks to the Security Cabinet in the early stages of the operation.

19 Elior Levy, “Documents seized during ‘Guardian of the Walls’ prove: The PA supported terrorism and terrorists (Hebrew),” Ynet, 16 April 2022 (<https://bit.ly/3Tpxb1q>).

20 Ibid.

Chapter IV – The Rebirth of the Paradigm

The “Dayton Model” – The Rebirth of the PASF

As noted, Operation Defensive Shield completely destroyed the force structure and status of the Palestinian Authority's security apparatuses. In June 2007, approximately two years after the implementation of the Disengagement Plan and the cessation of continuous Israeli military presence and operational activity in the Gaza Strip, and against the backdrop of the weakness of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces identified with Fatah and the Ramallah leadership, the Hamas terrorist organization carried out a violent military coup in Gaza.

The PASF, despite numerical superiority, collapsed within a matter of days, and the images of their members being thrown from rooftops by Hamas operatives made clear to the leadership of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah that without strong and organized security forces, their rule in the West Bank would also collapse.

This created a temporary and dangerous shared interest: the Palestinian Authority needed the IDF's help to suppress Hamas, and Israel needed the PASF as a first line of defense to prevent an Islamist takeover of Judea and Samaria.

In light of this shared interest, the “Dayton Plan²¹” was born, initiated by U.S. General Keith Dayton, with the aim of creating a “new Palestinian”—a

²¹ Shlomo Brom, “Update on Reform of the Palestinian Security Apparatuses,” INSS Insight No. 77, October 30, 2008. <https://bit.ly/4bDoBo7>.

professional, disciplined police officer detached from Fatah politics and nationalist ideology. As part of the program, thousands of members of the various branches of the PASF were sent to intensive training in Jordan, under close supervision by the CIA and Israel's General Security Service (Shin Bet or ShBaK), which reviewed every list of recruits to ensure they had no prior involvement in terrorism. For its part, Israel gradually began approving the entry of armored vehicles, communications equipment, and light weaponry to the PASF, based on the assumption that this time the system was built on foundations of professionalism and American oversight. Security coordination became a survival tool for Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, and the PASF began carrying out extensive arrests of Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives.²²

However, the utopian model that the United States and Israel sought to create also collapsed and became nothing more than a façade of stability. While on the surface the PASF displayed professionalism and discipline, beneath the surface the same destructive mechanisms of the Arafat era continued to operate. The Palestinian Authority continued to produce many terrorists from within its ranks, worked extensively to cultivate an ethos of “struggle”, financed families of terrorists through monthly salaries, and trained combat units with clear military characteristics instead of policing functions.

The new conceptual paradigm—which sought to view the PASF as a “subcontractor” for security coordination—began to crack as it became clear that the renewed force build-up was once again serving as a platform for the growth of terrorism from within the system itself.

Policemen by Day, Terrorists by Night

The Arab Research Division of the Regavim Movement, in cooperation with the “Behind the Scenes” OSINT unit, conducted an in-depth study examining the anomalous activity of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces. The study included a review of the complex training frameworks undergone by members of the apparatuses—both in local training bases and in various countries around the world—while analyzing the quality

²² Ibid.

and characteristics of the training, in order to obtain an up-to-date picture of the active force structure and the types of weaponry in use by the PASF.

Despite the strict criteria and the attempt of the “Dayton Model” to detach the PASF from the political and nationalist climate, in practice it appears that the current state of cooperation and the attempt to rebuild the same entity under a different guise are nothing more than window dressing.

The PASF, which ostensibly are meant to fight terrorism and assist Israel, are deeply and increasingly involved in acts of terrorism and murder against Israeli civilians and IDF soldiers.²³ Members of the PASF operate in a “dual-role” capacity: on the one hand, they serve in official policing frameworks, and on the other hand, many of them function as terrorists operating against Israeli security forces. Thus, between the years 2020–2025, at least 118 PASF officers were identified as having been directly involved in terrorism; most were killed while carrying out attacks and the Palestinian Authority declared them “martyrs.”²⁴

In practice, a scenario in which Israeli-supplied weapons are turned against Israel is not a future threat, but a reality already taking place at varying levels of intensity. The Palestinian Authority does not condemn members of its security forces who carry out attacks, but rather glorifies them as cultural heroes, educates generations of children to emulate and idolize them, honors their memory through lavish military funerals, centrally placed monuments, official condolence visits, and the payment of substantial salaries to their families.

This involvement reaches the highest levels. For example, Muhammad Abu Bakr, who was killed in an exchange of fire with IDF forces, served as the personal bodyguard of Mahmoud al-Aloul, deputy to Mahmoud Abbas. In addition, senior Palestinian figures such as Jibril Rajoub and PASF spokesperson Talal Dweikat boast that there are 365 members of the apparatuses imprisoned in Israeli prisons—some serving life sentences—as well as 2,000 “martyrs” from among the apparatuses over the past 30

23 “Officers by Day, Terrorists by Night.”
 24 “Officers by Day, Terrorists by Night,” a report published by the Regavim Movement that analyzed data through March 2024, detailed 78 terrorists who were either wounded or killed in action or apprehended by Israeli forces. Since the report’s publication we have obtained data and documentation regarding an additional 40 terrorists – all of them PASF officers, who were wounded, killed or apprehended as of December 2025..



Figure 3: Members of the BTS Force. Facebook

years.²⁵

According to some estimates, the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) pay salaries to approximately 65,000 personnel. Despite extensive efforts to verify the data, it remains unclear how many of them are actually serving in practice—both in Judea and Samaria and in the Gaza Strip. Various sources present conflicting figures regarding the active force size of the PASF in Judea and Samaria, with estimates ranging from approximately 32,000 to 60,000 troops. Despite the lack of clarity regarding the exact scope of the active force size, it is nonetheless clear that the PASF has exceeded the quota of 18,000 armed personnel established under the Oslo Accords.²⁶

25 Ibid., p. 65.
 26 The Regavim Movement, 9 March 2025: “The Wall of Jericho – How the PA is Preparing for War” (Chapter 18, Feet on the Ground Podcast Series).



Figure 4: Urban warfare training: From the Al Istiklal University Facebook page

It should be noted that within the State of Israel there is no reliable source or transparency regarding the number of PASF personnel. Whether due to the concealment of the true figures or the lack of knowledge and monitoring of training by Israeli authorities, this constitutes a severe failure and a first-order security threat.

This scope is not merely a violation of agreements; it entrenches the threat posed by a Palestinian Authority with an armed force twice the size of the entire Israel National Police²⁷ and nearly one-third of the total regular IDF force.²⁸ The quantitative gap is further underscored when analyzing the ratio to population: while in Israel approximately 3 police officers serve per 1,000 residents, in the Palestinian Authority the ratio is a staggering 19 armed personnel per 1,000 residents—seven times the ratio in Israel. This exceptional figure indicates that the PASF does not function as a standard civilian police force, but rather as a full-fledged army, with one armed individual for every 53 civilians.

27 Dr. Tehila Shachar, "Data on Israel Police Personnel" (Hebrew), Knesset Research and Information Center. <https://bit.ly/4bsTIEg>

28 Idan Eretz, "Towards a Discussion of Funding for Education for Combat Soldiers," (Hebrew), Globes 23 May 2022.

The PASF now includes three elite units with clear military characteristics, specializing in the seizure and breaching of communities and structures:²⁹

- **Unit 101 (National Security):** A commando unit specializing in urban warfare, breaching structures, and tactical parachuting.
- **S.A.T (Special Armed Team):** A rapid intervention and assault unit that uses high-speed sport motorcycles to conduct deep raids and mobile shooting operations.
- **BTS ("The Bat"):** Specializes in low-signature operations (leaving no trace) and nighttime combat in complete darkness using advanced night-vision equipment.

The process of upgrading the lethality of the PASF is supported by a tight organizational and logistical framework backed by Western actors, led by the Canadian and American missions (USSC). At the International Police Training Center near Amman, National Security Forces (NSF) battalions undergo tactical training programs under American supervision, including the use of live fire. This framework provides the PASF with the necessary



Figure 5: PASF cadets' artillery training exercise in Pakistan. From social media accounts

international legitimacy—effectively granting a "green light" for continued force build-up away from public scrutiny.

Beyond this Western framework, PASF personnel are sent to advanced military training courses in countries not subject to Western oversight, where they acquire the skills of a regular army in every respect.³⁰ In military academies in Pakistan and Russia, officers undergo long-term training that includes command and control of regular units, conventional warfare, and the use of artillery and armored forces. Graduates complete these programs with

29 See Appendix: Documentation and Sources: <https://bit.ly/4sYvyHn>.

30 See Appendix: Documentation and Sources, <https://bit.ly/4sYvyHn>.



Figure 6: PASF infantry training. From the PASF Training Division's Facebook page

academic degrees in military science, transforming the PASF command echelon into a professional military leadership.

At the same time, naval commando training and operational diving courses in Pakistan, alongside tactical parachuting training in Italy and classical military training in Algeria, create a wide range of offensive capabilities. The network of scholarships and training programs extends to countries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, and South Africa, illustrating the scope of the project to transform a police force into a trained army within the territory of the State of Israel.

The substantive shift is reflected on the ground through the acquisition of heavy weaponry, in direct contravention of the Oslo Accords, which limit the PASF to light arms only.³¹ Today, NSF battalions make extensive use of RPG-7 anti-tank launchers and PKM heavy machine guns (7.62 mm)—weapons whose sole purpose is to engage armored military vehicles and generate sustained fire against military forces.

Sniper capabilities have been upgraded through the conversion of

³¹ Amichai Shiloh, "Under the Right Wing Government: PA Conducts Maneuvers Without IDF Coordination, (Hebrew) Hakol Hayehudi, 16 December 2025. <https://bit.ly/3PomAop>

assault rifles into precision long-range sniper weapons. At the same time, armored vehicles such as the Jordanian Al-Jawad and Ford armored vehicles equipped with mounted machine-gun turrets have been introduced. The severity of the violation reaches its peak in the use of explosives: documentation from tactical firing ranges reveals training exercises involving the detonation of powerful explosive charges and assault scenarios incorporating the use of grenades and detonators. All of these are not tools of civilian policing, but rather the equipment of commando units designed for high-intensity combat.

At the central training base in Jericho (GMTC) and in additional facilities, dangerous infantry and field training exercises are conducted that closely resemble the processes carried out by Yasser Arafat during the Oslo years, when police forces were transformed into a full-fledged army under the cover of trust extended by Israel.³² These exercises include drills for the seizure and clearing of structures, extended field training exercises, survival training, and the use of breaching charges ("hot breaching"). The drills are conducted with structured operational planning procedures, sand-table briefings, and the use of advanced command-and-control systems—indicating preparation for the organized conquest of territory.

This professional military training is accompanied by deep ideological radicalization. Graduates of the academies undergo seminars and lectures promoting nationalist doctrines that reject the existence of the State of Israel. For example, in February 2025³³, an official conference was held within the PASF military training division marking the "Cursed Balfour Declaration Day," under the title: "The 108th anniversary of the cursed Balfour Declaration—the promise by those who does not own, to one who does not deserve."

In another event³⁴ held by the military training division at the central institute in Jericho to mark Palestinian Prisoners' Day (April 18, 2018), the head of the division, Major General Yusuf al-Hilu, emphasized that support for prisoners in "the prisons of the occupation" is a national and religious duty at the forefront of the Palestinian leadership's priorities.

³² See Appendix: Documentation and Sources. <https://bit.ly/4sYvyHn>

³³ See Appendix: Documentation and Sources, <https://bit.ly/4sYvyHn> .Manuvers Without IDF Coordination, (Hebrew) Hakol Hayehudi, 16 December 2025. <https://bit.ly/3PomAop>

³⁴ <https://bit.ly/4ssWlq8>



Figure 7: Ground Forces training drill. From the PASF Training Division's Facebook page

During the ceremony, which opened with the recitation of Al-Fatiha in memory of the martyrs, awards of recognition were granted to a group of released prisoners who had served—or were currently serving—as officers in the PASF: terrorists who had directed or carried out attacks and served lengthy prison sentences. This event highlights the deep connection and institutional backing granted first and foremost by the Palestinian Authority, and under it by the PASF military training system, to security prisoners, including their integration into the ranks of senior command within the PASF.

In a video published on November 11, 2025³⁵ by the PASF military training division to mark the anniversary of Yasser Arafat's death, images of Arafat were combined with those of Hamas founder Ahmad Yassin. The video includes Arafat's voice reciting a prophetic hadith³⁶ about a group from Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem) and its surroundings that will remain steadfast in its faith, defeat its enemies, and remain in a state of *ribat* (continuous struggle and defense) until the Day of Judgment. This hadith reflects a religious belief in Islamic victory through Jerusalem—an idea many viewed

35 <https://bit.ly/4bXucqB>

36 Masand Ahmed, Hadith 22320.

as having begun to materialize in the events of October 7.

The video continues with Arafat's words about "the nation of heroes" defending Islamic and Christian holy sites and the "Arab lands" from the ocean to the Gulf.

Beyond the glorification of terrorists and explicit support for terrorism, the PASF does not conceal the purpose of the military training of its personnel. As reflected in the content delivered in these training programs, the ultimate objective is not civilian policing, but the creation of an offensive force aimed at taking control of territory within the State of Israel.

Each weekend, videos are published on the social media pages of the Jericho training base featuring greetings and declarations of intent to return to various cities within Israel, including Jaffa, Tiberias, Haifa, Acre, Safed, Be'er Sheva and more.³⁷ At a formal graduation ceremony for one of the cadet classes at the Istiqlal University³⁸, graduates entering the parade ground were welcomed with the declaration: "Welcome, to the eyes that dream of Acre, Haifa, and Jaffa." This statement once again illustrates how the concept of "return" and the takeover of Israeli cities is an integral part of the military education of the PASF. Military exercises are given symbolic names that leave no doubt as to their strategic intent, such as the comprehensive exercise named "The Jordan Valley Fence."

This rhetoric, which threads through the fabric of the entire training system, consistently emphasizes that the purpose of the force is not merely the maintenance of public order, but rather to function as the spearhead in the struggle for the "independence of the Palestinian people," while preparing for scenarios in which Israeli-supplied weapons are turned against Israel and for direct confrontation with the State of Israel.

In addition to military training, the PASF, under the cover of its freedom of movement on roads throughout Judea and Samaria, conducts ongoing surveillance of communities, checkpoints, and military outposts. There is a growing pattern of patrols in close proximity to newly established

37 <https://x.com/RegavimEng/status/2034024071923482764?s=20>

38 <https://t.me/Regavim/1092>

Conclusion

communities and farms.³⁹

The combination of military training, heavy weaponry, and extreme ideology creates an unprecedented strategic threat of military raids and close-range massacres against the Israeli home front, similar to the events of October 7.

In addition, the Palestinian Authority uses the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) as a mechanism for “laundering” terrorists. According to an expose’ by Palestinian Media Watch, released terrorists were granted various officer ranks based on the length of time they had served in prison. Hundreds of them were subsequently integrated into roles within the PASF, with salaries determined according to rank rather than their actual duties. Some of them receive salaries without performing any function whatsoever.⁴⁰

Conceptual paradigms are the story we tell ourselves when we look at reality; they are the construct into which we attempt to fit the events and behaviors in our observable world. The events of October 7, which were the result of a long-standing conceptual paradigm that assumed quiet would be met with quiet. For far too long, we convinced ourselves that the other side sought normalization and co-existence – even while we observed the massive quantities of sand and earth that were being removed from the underground tunnels of Gaza and the massive stockpiling of weapons and ammunition on the other side of the fence. If there is anything the events of October 7th taught us, it is this: We must set aside the story we told ourselves and take a sober, broad, and serious look at the security reality around us.

While in the Gaza Strip the State of Israel has been working for the past two and a half years to dismantle terrorist infrastructure and the control of Hamas and other terrorist actors, in Judea and Samaria we are not only ignoring the largest terrorist force in the area—we are actively cooperating with it and treating it as an integral part of the work of our own security system.

The number of PASF personnel—whether police or soldiers—is not known with certainty, which in itself constitutes a severe failure. Yet even if we rely on the most conservative estimates regarding the PASF’s active force size, the violation of international law is significant. Add to this other serious infractions and excesses – weapons and ammunition far exceeding agreed-upon limits, the types of training these troops receive, and their public declarations of intent – and the seriousness of our current reality begins to come into focus.

So long as we continue to rely on the Palestinian Authority as an auxiliary arm of the IDF in Judea and Samaria, without recognizing that its openly declared orientation is toward terrorism and the destruction of the State of Israel, we are paving the way for the next disaster. So long as we cling to the narrative of Oslo’s guns being aimed toward peace, we may find ourselves facing even more severe realities than those we experienced so recently – murderous incursions into Israeli cities and communities, close-range combat, massacres and atrocities in the heart of Israel.

The lesson of October 7 must be unequivocal: There is no place for the Palestinian Authority and its security forces—neither in Judea and Samaria nor in Gaza. The security of the State of Israel must rest on its own sovereignty and strength, not on terrorist forces dedicated to the establishment of another Islamist state and the inevitable destruction of the State of Israel.


39 The Regavim Movement, 9 March 2025: “The Wall of Jericho – How the PA is Preparing for War” (Chapter 18, Feet on the Ground Podcast Series).

40 Maurice Hirsch, Adv. “Three ways the Palestinian Authority tried to hide its terror reward payments in 2021”, PMW, 09.02.2022; Maurice Hirsch, Adv. “Another Dark Side of the PA’s “Pay-For-Slay” Policy and Stage Two of the Gaza Plan”, JCF, 02.02.2026.



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